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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1993) and 6346b-16 (1993).
On

August

18,

1994, this

Court

issued

a

Notice

of

Consideration for Summary Disposition to review the issue of
whether it possesses subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
present Petition for Review.

On September 2, 1994, Petitioners,

Merit Electrical & Instrumentation, Juretich, Schiffman, Johnson,
and Vaness

(referred to hereinafter collectively as "Merit"),

submitted a Memorandum

in Opposition to Summary Disposition,

asserting that this Court has jurisdiction because the agency order
in this case

is final under

the Collateral

Order Doctrine.

Thereafter, Judge Jackson issued an Order, denying the Court's
motion

for

summary

dismissal

and

deferring

ruling

on the

jurisdictional issue until plenary presentation and consideration
of the issues raised by the Petition for Review. Merit's arguments
for appellate jurisdiction in this case are fully set out in their
memorandum attached as Addendum A.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Is it unlawful for the Respondent, the Department of

Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
("Division")

to

convert

citation

proceedings

to

a

formal

adjudication in light of its own procedural rules mandating that
contested

citations

be

conducted

proceedings?
144442

1

as

informal

adjudicatory

Standard of Review:

Merit raised this issue before the

Division in the Memorandum in Support of Request for Review of
Order Converting Citation to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings dated,
May 5, 1994. See Addendum B, Memo, at 4-7.

Utah appellate courts

review challenges based on an agency's failure to follow its own
procedures for correction of error.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

16(4) (e) (1993); Krantz v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 856 P.2d 369,
370 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
2.

Assuming arguendo that the Division has discretion to

convert proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4, has the
Division abused its discretion?
Standard of Review:

Merit raised this issue before the

Division in the Objection to Motion and Order Converting Contest of
Citations, dated March 3, 1994, and in the Memorandum in Support of
Request

for

Review

of

Order

Converting

Citation

to

Formal

Adjudicative Proceedings, dated May 5, 1994. See Addendum C at 4
and Addendum B, Memo, at 8.

A challenge to an agency decision in

the face of a purported statutory grant of discretion is affirmed
only if the agency decision is reasonable and rational. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16 (h) (i) (1993); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991).
3.

Does conversion under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3), deny

Merit equal protection?
Standard of Review:

Merit raised this issue before the

Division in the Memorandum in Support of Request for Review of
Order Converting Citation to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings, dated
144442

2

May 5, 1994.
show

no

See Addendum B, Memo, at 16.

deference

to

an

agency's

Utah appellate courts

decision

regarding

the

constitutionality of governing statutes or the constitutionality of
an agency's decisions.
constitutionality

of

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reviews
the

Division's

decision

to

convert

the

contested citation hearing to a formal proceeding in this case for
correctness.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(a)

(1993); Ouestar

Pipeline v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 817 P.2d 316, 317-18

(Utah

1991); Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) .
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The

following

constitutional

provisions,

statutes,

and

administrative rules are determinative of the issues on appeal.
The text for each of these is attached in full at Addendum D.
1.

United States Constitution, amendment XIV, § 1.

2.

Utah Constitution, article I, § 24.

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 (1993).

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1993).

5.

Utah Admin. R156-46b-202 (1994).

6.

Utah Admin. R156-46b-403

(1994).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this

case, Merit

challenges

an order of

the Division

converting citation proceedings from informal to formal.
On or about December 9, 1993, the Division issued citations
to Merit Electrical and Instrumentation, Inc. and four employees
alleging violations of the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act.

144442
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-1 et seq. (1994) .* The Division claims that
Merit Electrical violated § 58-55-2(32)(c)2 of the Act by hiring
unlicensed and non-exempt electricians as employees to perform
electrical

construction

work

in

connection

with

a

refinery

modernization project owned by Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation,
located near Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Division claims that each

of the individuals cited violated § 58-55-2(32) (a)3 by engaging in
a construction trade requiring a license (electrical) while not
licensed or exempted from licensure. Merit contests the citations
because the electrical work at the site is "construction and repair
relating to . . . metal and coal mining" and is therefore exempt
from licensure under Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-6(2) (1994).4
Merit timely filed notice with the Division contesting the
citations, denied violating the Act, and requested a hearing in
accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"),
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et seq. , and the applicable rules at
Utah Admin. R156-46b-l (1994), et seq.5 Despite the classification
1

Effective May 2, 1994, the Construction Trades Licensing Act was
renumbered. Thus, § 58-55-1 became § 58-55-101. In this brief, Petitioners will
refer to sections of the Act by reference to the numbering system that was in
effect at the time the citations were issued and which appear on the citations.
The corresponding new sections will be referenced in footnotes the first time any
section appears in the body of the brief.
2

Corresponding to Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-501(3) (Supp. 1994).

3

Corresponding to Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-501(1) (Supp. 1994).

4

Corresponding to Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-305(2) (Supp. 1994).

5
As of August 31, 1994, the Division amended the rules governing
agency adjudicatory procedures, but did not change the substance of the rule
sections cited in this brief. Citations to the Division's rules will be to those
in effect at the time the Conversion Order occurred. The corresponding new rule
numbers will be cited in a footnote the first time a citation to a rule occurs.
Copies of the new rules are included in Addendum E.

144442
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of hearings to contest citations as informal proceedings under
R156-46b-202(1)(m),6 the Division, on February 11, 1994, filed a
Motion to Convert to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings ("Motion to
Convert").

That same day, the presiding officer granted the

Division's motion and issued an Order Converting Citation to Formal
Adjudicative Proceedings. Merit timely filed an objection to the
Division's motion and the presiding officer's order. In response,
the presiding officer vacated his order on March 4, 1994. After
both parties submitted further responsive pleadings, the presiding
officer conducted a hearing on the Motion to Convert on March 28,
1994.
Order

On April 5, 1994, the presiding officer issued a second
Converting

Citation

("Conversion Order").

to Formal Adjudication

Proceedings

Merit filed a Request for Review of Order

Converting Citation to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings, dated May
5, 1994. The Executive Director of the Department of Commerce
issued an Order on Review which denies Merit's Request for Review.
Merit asks this Court to vacate the April 5, Conversion Order7
because the Conversion Order: (i) violates the Division's procedural rules, (ii) is unlawful under the governing statute, (iii)
was an abuse of discretion, insofar as the governing statute provides discretion, and (iv) denies Merit equal protection under the
law.

6

Corresponding to Utah Admin. R156-46b-202(1)(n).

7

Two orders are currently at issue: (i) the Department of Commerce's
Order on Review, issued on June 27, 1994, in which the Director of the Department
of Commerce refused to review the Conversion Order, and (ii) the underlying
April 5 Conversion Order. Except as separately referenced, these orders will be
collectively referred to as the Conversion Order.
144442
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
Merit

On December 9, 1993, the Division issued citations to

Electrical

and

Instrumentation,

Inc. and

four

of

its

employees alleging violations of the Utah Construction Trades
Licensing Act.
2.
Merit

Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-1 et seq. (1993).

The Division bases the citations on its allegation that
Electrical

electrical

hired

unlicensed

electricians

to

perform

construction work in connection with the refinery

modernization project owned by Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation
and thereby violated § 58-55-2 (32) (c) of the Construction Trades
Licensing Act.
3.

With respect to the individual employees, the Division

alleges that they engaged in electrical contracting work without a
license or without exemption from licensure in violation of § 5855-2(32) (a) .
4.

Citations were timely contested in accordance with the

instructions

included

on

the

citations,

the

UAPA,

and

the

applicable agency rules, which provide that contested citations be
adjudicated

as informal proceedings

hearing is required.
(1994).

for which an evidentiary

See Utah Admin. Code R156-46b-202 (1) (m)

Merit contests the citations because the electrical work

at the site is "construction and repair relating to . . . metal and
coal mining" and is therefore exempt from licensure under Utah Code
Ann. § 58-55-6(2) (1994).
5.

On February

11, 1994, despite

its own rule, which

classifies hearings to contest citations as informal, see Utah
Admin. R156-46b-202(1)(m) (1994), the Division filed a Motion to
Convert to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings.
144442
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See Addendum F.

6.

On the same day, the presiding officer, without the

benefit of briefing, issued an Order Converting Citation to Formal
Adjudicative Proceedings.
7.

See Addendum G.

In response to the Merit's objection, the presiding

officer vacated the order on March 4, 1994. See Addendum H.
8.

On April 5, 1994, the presiding officer issued a second

Order Converting Citation to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings. See
Addendum I.
9.

On May 5, 1994, Merit filed a Request for Review of the

Conversion Order, see Addendum B, and a Notice of Substitution of
Counsel.
10.

On June 27, 1994, the Executive Director of the Depart-

ment of Commerce issued an Order on Review denying Merit's Request
for Review on the ground that the Department has no jurisdiction to
review the Conversion Order, and remanded the proceedings to the
Division.
11.

See Addendum J.
Merit timely filed a Petition for Review with this Court

on July 27, 1994.
12.

The Court of Appeals issued a Notice of Consideration for

Summary Disposition on August 18, 1994, on the grounds that the
Petition For Review is taken from an interlocutory agency order and
the Court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
13.

On October 7, 1994, after the parties filed memoranda

supporting their positions, Judge Jackson issued an order denying
the Court's own motion for summary dismissal and required plenary
presentation of the case.

144442
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Merit has petitioned this court to vacate the Conversion
Order, which converts consolidated citation proceedings from an
informal to a formal adjudication. The effect of the conversion is
to change the procedures used at the administrative hearing level
and, more significantly, to alter the nature of judicial review of
the agency decision.

Specifically, the Conversion Order, in

denying Merit's objections, justified the Division's failure to
comply with the its own rules mandating citation proceedings to be
conducted

as

informal

hearings, by

placing

reliance

on the

Division's policy manual which contains model forms for conversion
and by summarily relying upon the language contained in the Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-4, which provides for conversion of agency
proceedings in limited circumstances. The order concluded that the
explicit statutory prerequisites which require conversions: (i) to
be in the public interest and (ii) not to be prejudicial to the
parties, had been met.
The

reasoning

and

conclusions

of

law

underpinning

the

Conversion Order are flawed, and as a result the order violates the
Division's own rules, is contrary to law, and is otherwise an abuse
of discretion. Merit further asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4
deprives Merit of equal protection under the law, both because the
conversion statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied
in this case.
As an initial matter, the Conversion Order is contrary to the
Division's own rules that contested citations be adjudicated as
144442

8

informal proceedings which include a required evidentiary hearing.
Nowhere in the rules is there a reservation of discretion to change
the mandated informal hearing.

Moreover, on its face, Utah Code

Ann. § 63-46b-4 does not permit conversion in cases where the
Division has designated a particular proceeding as informal by
rule. Statutory language aside, an agency cannot promulgate a rule
that

limits

its

statutory

discretion

and

discretion, as if the rule did not exist.

then

exercise

its

In this case, the

Division limited its discretion to convert by promulgating a rule
that mandates an informal proceeding for contested citations.
Therefore, it cannot now convert to a formal proceeding.
Even assuming arguendo that the Division has authority to
convert, it has abused its discretion in this case because the
Conversion Order fails to satisfy the statutory requirements for
conversion.

The hearing procedures the presiding officer seeks,

and uses to justify the conversion, are already available as part
of the informal evidentiary hearing mandated by the Division's own
rules discussed in the Division's policy manual.

Examination of

witnesses, submittal of rebuttal evidence and use of the expertise
of the Contractor's Licensing Board are all, as sought, available
to the Division in the context of the informal hearing. Thus, the
basis for justifying the public interest is purely illusionary.
Similarly, the criterion that the parties will not be prejudiced is
not met. When an agency engages in an unlawful procedure or fails
to follow prescribed procedures, it is presumed, as a matter of
law,
144442

that

the

party

claiming

relief
S

has

been

"statutorily

prejudiced." Furthermore, the conversion denies Merit the right to
a de novo trial (where the rules of evidence and civil procedure
are fully applicable).

Thus, neither prong of the conversion

statute has been met and it must be reversed as an abuse of
discretion.
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 is unconstitutional
both on its face and as it applied in this case because it deprives
Merit, as part of a class contesting citations, of equal protection
of the law.

In order to provide equal protection to all parties

contesting citation proceedings, the statute must insure that
similarly situated parties within the class are treated similarly.
The

conversion

justification.

statute does not, on its face, provide such
The criteria, especially

the public

interest

requirement, are vacuous in that they provide no guidance for
determining which parties are selected from a similarly situated
class for different treatment. The class in this case consists of
parties contesting citations, yet, the statute provides no guidance
for either identifying that class or for determining which parties
from the class are singled out for a different procedural track.
Denial of equal protection by the application of the statute is
evidenced by the fact that the Division converted only one other
citation proceeding from a formal to an informal proceeding.
Accordingly, the conversion statute must be considered to be
arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited.

144442
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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE DIVISIONS CONVERSION ORDER MUST BE VACATED AS
THE ORDER IS CONTRARY TO THE DIVISION'S OWN
PROCEDURAL RULES, IS CONTRARY TO LAWf AND IS
OTHERWISE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The Conversion Order, dated April 5, 1994, must be vacated as
the reasoning and conclusions of law underpinning the order, and
denying Merits' objections, are flawed.
Division's

own procedural

The order violates the

rules, is contrary

to law and is

otherwise an abuse of discretion.
Specifically, the Conversion Order concludes that any argument
that

the

conversion

is

in violation

of

the Division's

own

procedural rules, Utah Admin. R156-460-202(1)(m) and 403(3) is
without merit, because the Division's Bureau of Investigations,
Policies and Procedures Manual ("Division's Policies") "anticipated
that

such

conversions

to

formal

proceedings

would

occur

in

appropriate cases and included model forms drafted for the purpose
of conversion of such cases to formal proceedings." See Conversion
Order at 2 (Addendum I).

The Conversion Order further concludes

that Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) "clearly provides, 'any' informal
proceeding may be converted to form proceeding." See Addendum I at

Having summarily dismissed the binding effect of its own
rules,

the

order

then

goes

on

to

review

the

criteria

for

conversion, that is: (i) is conversion in the public interest and
(ii) does conversion unfairly prejudice any party.

The presiding

officer found that the public interest criterion was met because
the Merit
144442

proceeding is "highly disputed in what may be a novel
11

interpretation of the facts and law which may require the cross
examination of witnesses and require submittal of rebuttal evidence
in order [to] fully address the issues in the case, and may require
the expertise of the Contractor's Licensing Board."
Order at 3 (Addendum I) .

Conversion

As to any prejudicial effect, the

presiding officer found that: (i) informal proceedings did not
provide adequate procedures for adjudicating the issues involved
and (ii) denying Merit the right to a district court was not a
basis for conducting an informal proceeding.
Each of these arguments must fail.

First, the Conversion

Order is unlawful for the simple reason that the Division has
failed to follow the procedure which it has prescribed for itself
in

Rule

156-46b-202 (1) (m) .

It

is

the

basic

tenant

of

administrative law that an agency cannot violate its own rules and
regulations.

Those rules have the force and effect of law and

equally bind the agency and those being regulated.8
Code Ann.

§ 63-46b-4

(1993) , on

its

Second, Utah

face, does not permit

conversion when an agency has chosen, by formal rulemaking, to
mandate that a particular class of proceedings be adjudicated
informally.

The language of the statute aside, after a rule

mandating a particular type of proceeding has been promulgated, the
Division has, de facto, chosen to limit any grant of discretion

8

Even the Division recognizes that its own rules have the force of
law. The Division's Orientation and Reference Manual for Professional Licensing
Board Members, states: "There are two basic types of laws with which the Boards
and Division deal in the licensing and regulation of designated occupations or
professions. . . . The first are statutes. . . . The second type of law are
rules." Orientation Manual at 8 (1994) (Addendum K ) .
144442

12

that it might otherwise have.

Lastly, assuming arguendo the

Division retains discretion to convert licensing procedures from
informal to formal proceedings, the Conversion Order in this case
cannot stand because it fails to satisfy the statutory requirements
for conversion.

In short, the Division can find no refuge in Utah

Code Ann. §63-46b-4 for converting the instant proceedings and the
order should be vacated.

Each of these arguments is addressed, in

turn, below.
A.

The Division1s Conversion Order Must be Vacated as the
Order is Contrary to the Division1s Rules Which Mandate
that Contested Citations Shall be Adjudicated by an
Informal Proceeding with an Evidentiary Hearing,
1.

The Division1 s Rules Mandate that an Informal
Proceeding with an Evidentiary Hearing be Conducted
to Adjudicate the Citations at Issue in This Case,

The UAPA provides two tracks for adjudicative proceedings
within state agencies--formal and informal.

Under Utah Code Ann.

§ 63-46b-4 (1993), all agency adjudicative proceedings are formal
unless the agency's rules designate that they are informal. Formal
adjudications embody a trial-like proceeding that includes, among
other characteristics, discovery, motion practice, an evidentiary
hearing on the record, intervention, and written findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
(1993).

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-6 through 10

For an informal proceeding, however, discovery and

intervention are prohibited, and no hearing occurs unless provided
for by rule or statute.9

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5 (1993) .

9
A hearing may be conducted on the record at the request and expense
of the parties and the production of evidence may be required at the hearing.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(e) & (2)(a) (1993).
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Most importantly, while the UAPA guarantees a trial de novo in
district court to parties to an informal proceeding, with attendant
appeal, a party

to a

formal proceeding

can only appeal an

unfavorable ruling to an appellate court with the attendant limited
review (e.g., appellate courts grant great deference to agency
factual determinations). Id. at 63-46b-15 and 16. Thus, the most
critical difference between a formal and informal adjudication is
that parties to an informal adjudication can obtain two levels of
judicial review--at the district court and appellate court--whereas
parties to a formal adjudication have only one opportunity for
review.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(l) (1993), the Division
has designated proceedings to adjudicate contested citations issued
under the Construction Trades Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 5855-13(4) (1994),10 as informal. See Utah Admin. R156-46b-202 (1) (m)
(1994) . Furthermore, as allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5, the
Division's rules specifically mandate an evidentiary hearing for
adjudication of contested citations.

Utah Admin. R156-46b-403(3)

(1994) .
Merit contested the licensing citations issued to them in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-13(4) (1994).
own

rule

mandating

that

contested

citations

be

Despite its
informally

adjudicated, the Division successfully converted the citations
proceedings from informal to formal. The effect of this conversion

10

144442

Corresponding to Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-503(4) (Supp. 1994).
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is to place Merit on a procedural track which is contrary to the
Division's rules and therefore contrary to law.11
2.
By

The Conversion to a Formal Proceeding Violates the
Division#s Procedural Rules.

converting

the

citations

proceedings

to

a

formal

adjudication in the face of its own rules mandating an informal
adjudication with an evidentiary hearing, the Division has violated
its own procedural rules. In State ex rel. Department of Community
Affairs v. Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah
1980), the Utah Supreme Court unequivocally held that agencies must
abide by their own procedural rules or face reversal on appeal.
The Division has engaged in the same sort of procedural misstep as
the agency in Merit and must similarly be reversed.
In Merit, the Merit System Council excluded a Department of
Community Affairs representative from an administrative hearing,
despite the fact that the Merit Council's procedural rules provided
that a representative of the agency could be present during such a
hearing.

The Court held that "administrative regulations are

presumed to be reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or
followed by the agency to suit its own purposes.

Such is the

essence of arbitrary and capricious action." Id. Accordingly, the
Court remanded the case to the agency because "[t]he council cannot
violate its own procedural rules."

Id. ; see also Frisby v. United

11
By failing to comply with its own rules and by placing Petitioners
on a different track with a different set of procedural safeguards, the Division
has also deprived them of due process. See D.B. v. Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (the Division's
unlawful procedure or decision making process constitutes due process violation) .
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States Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev. , 755 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3rd Cir.
1985) ("Failure on the part of the agency to act in compliance with
its own regulations is fatal to such action."); Hartnett v.
Cleland, 434 F. Supp. 18 (D.S.C. 1977) (when an administrative
agency takes any action affecting the rights of a party, the agency
"must scrupulously comply with its own rules and regulations").
The Division in this case is attempting to do exactly what the
Merit Court prohibited--violate its own procedural rules.
transgression is blatant.

The

The Division's rules provide for an

informal adjudication with attendant de novo review in district
court, and yet the Division has converted to a formal proceeding
with limited appellate review.
Moreover,

the

regulatory

scheme

governing

this

case

illustrates the Division's special concern for and attention to
contested citation adjudications.

The Division did not simply

classify citation hearings as informal, but also "required" an
evidentiary hearing for such proceedings.

Utah Admin. R156-46b-

403(3) (1994). This is noteworthy because "[e]videntiary hearings
are not required for informal division adjudicative proceedings
unless required by statute or rule, or permitted by rule and
requested by a party . . . ." Utah Admin. R156-46b-403 (1) (1994).
While the Division designated some twenty proceedings as informal,
see Utah Admin. R156-46b-202 (1) (1994), it required the additional
safeguard of a hearing only for contested citations and one other
proceeding.

144442
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In the same vein, the Division's Policies state that informal
proceedings are intended to address the specific issue in dispute
in the instant case: "Was there a legal basis to issue the
citations?"

See Division's Policies at 45 (Addendum L).

When a

party contests the legal basis of a citation the Division's
Policies provide certain explicit procedural rights. For example,
parties are entitled to "testify, present evidence, and comment on
the issues at the hearing.

In putting on evidence Respondents may

testify, call and examine witnesses, and introduce evidence." Id.
at 37.

This framework suggests that the Division thoughtfully

contemplated

the nature of such adjudications and devised a

proceeding that limited the complexity involved in discovery and
intervention, but that ensured procedural rights commensurate with
the complexity of issues involved with contested citations.
The Division cannot now abandon its own procedural rules.
"Such is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action" and
constitutes reversible error.
3.

Merit. 614 P.2d at 1263.

The Utah Administrative Procedure Act Requires This
Court to Vacate the Conversion Order,

Based on the forgoing discussion, the Division has clearly
violated its own procedural rules by converting the citations to a
formal proceeding.

The UAPA explicitly requires that Merit be

granted relief from the Conversion Order.
Under the UAPA:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced
by any of the following:
144442
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(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow
prescribed procedure,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)
finds that an agency

(1993).

Once an appellate court

failed to follow its own procedures, it

presumes substantial prejudice and grants relief.

Krantz v. Utah

Dept. of Commerce, 856 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . Having
shown that the Division has "failed to follow

[its] prescribed

procedure," Merit respectfully requests this Court to grant relief
by vacating the Conversion Order.
B.

Utah Code Ann, S 63-46b-4 Does Not Authorize Conversion
of Proceedings Designated bv Rule as Informal.
Careful reading of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 reveals that

the statute does not permit conversion of proceedings

that an

agency has designated informal by rule. Accordingly, the Division
has

no

statutory

or

regulatory

discretion

to

convert

Merit's

citations proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 (1993), which the Division relies on
to convert the citation proceedings, provides:
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings to be
conducted
informally
according
to
the
procedures set forth in rules enacted under
the authority of this chapter . . . .
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection
(3) , all agency proceedings not specifically
designated as informal proceedings by the
agency's rules shall be conducted formally in
accordance with the requirements of this
chapter.

144442
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(3) Any time before a final order is issued in
any adjudicative proceeding, the presiding
officer may convert a formal adjudicative
proceeding to an informal adjudicative proceeding,
or
an
informal
adjudicative
proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding
if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is
in the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding
does not unfairly prejudice the
rights of any party.
(emphasis added).

When read in isolation, subsection (3) appears

to allow conversion of any proceeding.

However, when the three

sections are read as a whole, it becomes apparent that subsection
(3) serves solely to modify default proceedings delineated in
subsection (2) .

The Legislature did not preface subsection (1)

with the same limiting language as subsection (2), and therefore
intended

subsection

(1)

to

stand

alone

and

independent

of

subsection (3). If the Legislature intended for subsection (3) to
apply to designated hearings, such as the hearings at issue in this
case, it would have made subsection (1) "subject to the provisions
of Subsection (3)," as it did with subsection (2). Cf. Maverik
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n. 860 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that omission of or reference to a
specific adjacent subsection of a statute evidences legislative
intent) . Since the Division, by way of Rule 156-46b-202 (1) (m) , has
specifically designated contested citation hearings as informal
adjudicative proceedings, the proceedings in this case fall within
the ambit of subsection (1) , and are therefore not subject to
Conversion under subsection
144442
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Accordingly, the presiding

officer acted beyond his statutory authority in converting the
present adjudication to a formal proceeding, and the Conversion
Order is void.
Setting the language of the statute aside, the Division
cannot, as a matter of law, convert Merit's citation proceedings.
By lawfully promulgating a rule designating citation proceedings as
informal, the Division abrogated any discretion it claims under the
Conversion Statute to convert Merit's hearing from an informal to
a formal adjudication. Once an agency promulgates a rule limiting
its discretion, it cannot reassert its authority to exercise
discretion while its rule is in effect.
that

It is well established

"[e]ven if the action of an agency is discretionary by

statute, the agency's own regulations must be complied with by the
agency after they are issued."

California Human Dev. Corp. v.

Brock, 762 F.2d 1044, 1049 (D.D.C. 1985).
The seminal case in this area illustrates the point.

In

United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shauahnessy. 347 U.S. 260, 98
L.Ed. 681, 74 S. Ct. 499

(1954), the Immigration Act of 1917

provided the Attorney General with authority to exercise discretion
in considering appeals to deportation decisions.

The Attorney

General had issued regulations which delegated that authority to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.

When the Attorney General

interfered with an appeal of a deportation order, the

Supreme

Court held that "as long as the regulations remain operative, the
Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep the Board or
dictate its decision in any manner."
144442
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Id. at 267, 98 L.Ed. 686.

Therefore, even though a statute provided the Attorney General with
certain discretionary powers, he could not exercise those powers
because "the regulations prescribe the procedure to be followed in
processing an alien's application for suspension of deportation."
Id. at 267, 98 L.Ed. 686. See also John S. Service v. John Foster
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 77 S. Ct. 1152, 1 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1957) (even
though statute granted Secretary of State broad discretion in
discharging employees, Secretary was nonetheless bound by the
agency's procedural rules, which limited that discretion).
To the extent the Conversion Statute provides the presiding
officer any discretion to convert a proceeding, the Accardi
Doctrine applies with equal vigor to the instant case.

The

Division has opted to promulgate rules that limit its discretion by
providing for a particular procedural track, namely the informal
track.

The Division has limited

its discretion

further by

mandating a particular type of hearing for informal proceedings
related to citations.

See Utah Admin. R156-46b-403(3)

(1994)

(evidentiary hearing required).
In the very same rule that governs this proceeding, the
Division retained its discretion to convert other proceedings.12
For example, Utah Admin. R156-46b-202(1) (q) (1994) provides that
declaratory orders are designated informal "when determined by the
director to be conducted as an informal adjudicative proceeding."
It is disingenuous for the Division to say now that it silently

12

The Division has not promulgated a rule retaining discretion to convert
informal proceedings to formal.
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retained discretion to convert contested citation proceedings when
it explicitly retained discretion for another type proceeding in
the same rule, but did not do so for citation proceedings such as
those at issue.
Just as the regulation in
to be

followed

Accardi prescribed the procedures

for deportation

appeals,

the Division's

rules

governing this case prescribe the procedure for citation hearings.
The Division cannot now attempt to exercise discretion under the
statute while its own rule, which limits its discretion, is in full
force and effect.

By doing so the Division violates its own

procedural rule, which is fatal to its decision.

See Frisby v.

United States Dept. of Housing & Urban Devel.. 755 F.2d 1052, 1055
(3d Cir. 1985) ; State ex rel. Department of Community Affairs v.
Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 1980).
C.

Even if Conversion is Permissible for Adjudications
Mandated as Informal, in This Case, the Division Fails to
Satisfy the Statutory Requirements for Conversion Under
Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-4(3).

Even assuming
Division

has

the Division has authority

failed

to

meet

the

statutory

to convert, the
requirements

for

conversion in the instant case, and thereby abused its discretion.
The Conversion Statute provides that the presiding officer may
convert an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal proceeding
only if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the
public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party.

144442
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) (1993) . Despite the UAPA requirement
that both conditions for conversion be met, the presiding officer's
decision to convert this hearing fails to meet either prerequisite.
1.

The Presiding Officer Failed to Show that the Conversion
Order is in the Public Interest.

The presiding officer's basis for converting is summarized in
the Conversion Order:
the proceeding to be conducted are [sic]
highly disputed in what may be a novel
interpretation of the facts and law which may
require the cross examination of witnesses and
require submittal of rebuttal evidence in
order to fully address the issues in the case,
and may require the expertise of the
contractors licensing board.
See Conversion Order at 3 (Addendum E) .

Close scrutiny of the

presiding officer's rationale shows that these factors do not
support a finding that conversion is in the public interest.

The

procedures that the presiding officer seeks are already available
under the informal evidentiary hearing mandated by the Division's
own rules.
The resolution of Merit's citations requires the Division to
resolve exactly the kind of issue contemplated by an informal
adjudication.

The Division's Policies provide:

The only issues properly before the presiding
officer are as follows:

144442

a.

Was there a legal basis to issue the
citation?

b.

If so, was it fair to issue the citation?

c.

If so, what is the appropriate penalty?
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See Division's Policies at 45 (emphasis added) (Addendum L) . The
question confronting the presiding officer in the instant case is
whether there is a legal basis for the citations issued to Merit,
that is, whether Merit's activities fall within the statutory
exemption

from

licensure

for

persons

"engaged

in

construction and repair relating to . . . metal and coal mining."
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-6(2) (1994).

The fact that this issue is,

in the words of the presiding officer, "highly disputed" has no
bearing whatsoever on the public interest.

If "highly disputed"

issues can serve as a reasonable basis for conversion, the Division
could

convert

any

time

a

party

does

not

acquiesce

to

the

allegations in a citation.
Additionally, conversion is not necessary so as to avail the
Division of the procedures identified in the Conversion Order.
Those procedures are equally available in the mandated informal
proceeding.

The presiding officer simply failed to recognize the

extent of procedures available in an informal adjudication for
contested citations.

The UAPA explicitly provides parties to an

informal hearing with the right to "testify, present evidence, and
comment on the issues."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5 (1) (c) (1993).

While the UAPA is silent on the right to cross-examine, the
Division's

Policies

and

Procedures

provide

that parties

can

"testify, call and examine witnesses, and introduce documentary
evidence."13

See Division's policies at 37, (Addendum L).

13

Since

The UAPA is entirely silent on cross-examination and rebuttal
evidence with regard to informal hearings. When the Legislature wanted to
prohibit an activity during informal proceedings it did so explicitly. For
144442
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it would violate due process for an administrative agency to permit
parties to testify without permitting cross-examination, see D.B.
v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d
1145

(Utah Ct. App. 1989), the right to "examine witnesses"

necessarily implies the right of the opposing party to crossexamine.

Furthermore, the presiding officer can "issue subpoenas

or other orders to compel production of necessary evidence." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(e)

(1993).

These informal adjudication

procedures, provide the presiding officer an ample procedural
armamentarium for resolving whether Merit's activities are exempt
from licensure as "construction and repair relating to . . . metal
and coal mining."
Similarly, the presiding

officer's claimed need

for the

expertise of the Contractors and Electricians Licensing Boards can
be adequately addressed through an informal proceeding.

The

Director of the Division has authority to designate "an individual
or body of individuals to conduct or to assist the director in
conducting any part or all of an adjudicative proceeding."

Utah

Code Ann. § 58-1-109(1) (1993).

If the director believes that the

issues

of

surrounding

resolution

the

citations

require

the

expertise of the Contractors Licensing Board or the Electricians
Licensing Board, he can designate those boards to assist the
presiding officer during the informal adjudicative proceeding. In

example the UAPA explicitly prohibits discovery and intervention for informal
proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(e) and (g) . Interestingly, Utah Code
Ann. § 3-46b-6-10# which outline formal proceedings, is also silent on whether
rebuttal evidence is allowed.
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essence, the Board can become a de facto expert for the presiding
officer.

Consequently, a formal proceeding offers absolutely no

additional opportunity for the presiding officer to utilize the
expertise of the Contractors and Electricians Licensing Board.
In a separate vein, the Contractors and Electricians Boards
are unlikely to provide any expertise in this matter.

The main

issue to be decided in this case is whether Merit's activities are
exempt from licensure because electrical work at the refinery is
"construction and repair relating to . . . metal and coal mining."
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-6(2) (1994). While these boards might well
have specialized insight into construction and electrical issues,
they have no more expertise in determining whether a particular
activity is related to an integrated mining operation than they
have in assessing whether a particular activity constitutes the
practice of law.

Consequently, the involvement of these boards

will be wholly unhelpful in adjudicating the citations and cannot
justify the Conversion Order on the basis of being in the public
interest.
In view of the presiding officer's inherent fact finding
powers, his basis for justifying the public interest is purely
illusory and cannot withstand the slightest scrutiny. Accordingly,
since the presiding officer did not fulfill his burden of showing
that the public interest requirement under the conversion statute
is met, the Conversion Order does not satisfy the dual requirements
of the Conversion Statute and must be vacated as an abuse of
discretion.
144442
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2.

The Conversion Order Unfairly Prejudices Merit.

The Conversion Order similarly falls because the presiding
officer failed to meet the second requirement for conversion, which
provides that the presiding officer must show that conversion "does
not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party." Utah Code Ann, §
63-46b-4 (3) (b) (1993).

When an agency engages in an unlawful

procedure, or fails to follow prescribed procedures, a court
presumes that the party claiming relief has been "substantially
prejudiced."

Krantz v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 856 P.2d 369, 371

(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

In this case, the Division has failed to

adjudicate Merit's citations informally as its own rules prescribe.
See Utah Admin. R156-46b-202 (1) (m) . Furthermore, as is more fully
discussed elsewhere in this brief, conversion denies Merit the
right to a de novo trial, where the rules of evidence and civil
procedure are fully applicable with no deference to the agency's
findings and conclusions

Accordingly, Merit has been unfairly

prejudiced, and the Conversion Order fails.
Despite the requirement that the presiding officer show that
both requirements under the Conversion Statute be met before
converting a proceeding, he failed to show that either requirement
is met in this case.
therefore,

outside

The basis for the Conversion Order is

"the

bounds

of

reasonableness"

and

the

Conversion Order constitutes an abuse of discretion. Morton Int'1,
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 1991) .
Merit therefore asks this Court to vacate the Order and to remand
this case for an informal adjudication before the Division.
144442
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II.

THE CONVERSION STATUTE. UTAH CODE ANN. S 63-46B-4Q).
DENIES MERIT EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW.

The Conversion Statute is unconstitutional both on its face
and as it is applied in this case because it deprives Merit, as
part of a class contesting citations, of equal protection under the
law.

It is unconstitutional on its face because it permits the

Division to create two adjudicatory tracks, formal and informal,
for similarly situated parties. These tracks embody very different
procedural rights, particularly where the right to judicial review
is concerned.

In order to provide equal protection to all parties

contesting citation proceedings, the statute must ensure that
similarly situated parties within a class are treated similarly.
Yet, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 allows conversion under subpart (3)
if conversion is in the public interest and if conversion will not
prejudice the rights of any party.

Without more, on its face,

these criteria cannot provide sufficient criteria to ensure that
those who are similarly situated will be treated the same. Just as
importantly, as applied in this case, the Conversion Statute
violates equal protection guarantees because it has allowed the
Division to single out Merit for unfair treatment different than
others who contest citations.
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A.
At

The Conversion Statute is Unconstitutional on its Face.
its

core, the principle

of

equal

protection14 means

"persons similarly situated should be treated similarly," Malan v.
Lewis, 693 P.2d
administrative

661, 669 (Utah 1984) .
agencies,

As to parties before

"[e]gual protection protects against

discrimination within a class."

State Tax Comm'n v. Department of

Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1978) . When a statute unfairly
creates two classes, that

statute "must be considered to be

arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited."

Id. at 1298.

There is nothing particularly novel about this argument. Utah
courts consistently strike down statutes that permit agencies to
create two classes from a similarly situated group.

In Amax

Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah
1990) , for example, the Utah Supreme Court held that a tax statute
violated the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution by
unfairly creating two classes of taxpayers.

In that case, the

State and Tooele County assessed properties for tax purposes by the
same method.

However, a statute permitted the State to tax

property at 100% of its assessed value and permitted Tooele County
to tax property based on 80% of its value. The Court reasoned that
the statutory classification of property on the basis of who taxed
it created two classes of properties assessed by the same method.
Therefore, the classification "arbitrarily discriminated against

14

Utah Constitution Article I, section 24 reads: "All laws of a general
nature shall have uniform operation." The Utah Supreme Court has explained that
"principles and concepts embodied in the federal equal protection clause and the
state uniform operation of the law provision are substantially similar." Blue
Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989).
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one class merely because it is a state-assessed property."

Id. at

1261. Since the discrimination bore no reasonable relationship to
the statutory scheme, the statute violated the uniform operation of
the law clause in the Utah Constitution.
Gaufin, 867 P.2d
limitations

Id. : see also Lee v.

52 (Utah 1993) (medical malpractice statute of

denied

equal protection

because

it

discriminated

against minors) ; Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) (guest
statute denied equal protection because it singled out nonpaying
passengers from a larger class); Continental Bank and Trust Comp.
v. Farminaton City, 599 P.2d 1242

(Utah 1979)

(licensing tax

arbitrarily created an impermissible class for tax purposes);
Broadbent v. Gibson, 140 P.2d 939 (Utah 1943) (Sunday closing law
unconstitutional

because

it

treated

similar

businesses

differently).
In a similarly reasoned case, the Utah Supreme Court held that
the Tax Commission singled out the State Insurance Fund for unfair
treatment by making it pay a tax that private insurers did not have
to pay.
1978).

State Tax Comm'n v. Dept. of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah
In

holding

the

statute

authorizing

the

tax

unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that while "the legislature
has considerable discretion in the designation of classifications
the court must determine whether such classifications
operate equally on all persons similarly situated."

Id. at 1298.

When a statute permits a party to be singled out for unfair
treatment, the statute "must be considered to be arbitrary and
constitutionally prohibited."

144442
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Like the statutes in Amax and Department of Finance, the
Conversion Statute permits the Division to create two classes from
among similarly situated parties--one class receives an informal
adjudication by rule and the other receives a formal adjudication
by conversion.

Additionally, the Conversion Statute provides no

useful criteria for assuring that parties subject to conversion
receive equal protection.

The Conversion Statute merely provides

that the presiding officer can convert if:

(i) conversion is in

the public interest and (ii) conversion does not unfairly prejudice
any party.
In order to meet equal protection requirements, a statute must
justify creating separate classifications from a similarly situated
group to ensure that parties within that classification are treated
similarly.

The Conversion Statute does not, on its face provide

such justification. These criteria, especially the public interest
requirement, are vacuous in that they provide no guidance for
determining which parties are selected from a similarly situated
class for different treatment. The class in this case consists of
parties contesting citations, yet, the statute provides no guidance
for determining which parties from that class are singled out for
a different procedural track. Accordingly, the Conversion Statute
"must

be

considered

prohibited."

to

be

arbitrary

and

constitutionally

Dept. of Finance, 576 P.2 at 1298. Merit therefore

asks this Court to vacate the Conversion order that was issued
pursuant to the statute.

144442
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B.

The Conversion State i s Unconstitutional as Applied in
t h i s Case.

In order for the Conversion S t a t u t e to be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under
equal p r o t e c t i o n

principles,

"[w]hat

operation of the law be uniform."
(Utah 1993) .
unfairly

to

is

critical

is

that

the

Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 577

The Conversion S t a t u t e has been used in t h i s case
single

out

Merit

for

conversion

to

the

formal

adjudicatory t r a c k .
The fact t h a t Merit was singled out for s p e c i a l treatment i s
evidenced by the D i v i s i o n ' s response t o M e r i t ' s GRAMA r e q u e s t s .
Those requests i l l u s t r a t e t h a t of the 1,313 c i t a t i o n s issued since
October 1992, only s i x have been converted t o formal a d j u d i c a t i o n .
See

Division's

Addendum M.
case.

Response

to

Request

for

Record

attached

as

Five of these s i x c o n s i s t of the c i t a t i o n s in t h i s

Even considering only the 314 cases l i s t e d as going t o

hearings, 1 5 the Division has singled out Merit from a l a r g e group
of s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d p a r t i e s for s i n g u l a r , s p e c i a l treatment among
those. 1 6

Id.

By converting the c i t a t i o n hearings, the Division deprives
Merit of the r i g h t s embodied in an informal proceeding.
significantly,

Most

the Division has deprived Merit of the r i g h t

l i t i g a t e t h e i r claims in d i s t r i c t c o u r t .

to

The UAPA provides t h a t

15
The Attorney General's o f f i c e l a t e r c l a r i f i e d t h i s GRAMA response by
l e t t e r which s t a t e d t h a t , a f t e r reviewing the D i v i s i o n ' s docket, only 58
c i t a t i o n s a c t u a l l y went t o hearing.
16

A Utah a p p e l l a t e court can take j u d i c i a l n o t i c e j u s t as any t r i a l
court can. Under the Utah Rule of Evidence 201, t h i s Court can take j u d i c i a l
n o t i c e of the D i v i s i o n ' s response t o a GRAMA request.
See Moore v. Utah
Technical College, 727 P.2d 634, 639 n.17 (Utah 1986) (Supreme Court can take
j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of administrative proceedings and a c t i o n s ) .
144442
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parties to an informal adjudication are entitled to de novo trial
in district court, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1520 parties to a formal
hearing are entitled only to appellate review. Id. at § 63-46b-16.
Appellate review differs tremendously from a de novo trial. A de
novo

trial

in district

court provides a party appealing an

administrative agency decision the opportunity to present its case
to an impartial trier of fact for a fresh look under the Rules of
Evidence. An appeals court, on the other hand, grants substantial
deference to the administrative agency, and will only overturn an
agency's decision on limited grounds.

See id. : see generally

Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814
P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); SEMECO Indus.. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 849
P.2d 1167, 1170-74
Conversion

(Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting).

Statute,

therefore,

permits

the

The

Division

to

substantially reduce Merit's access to judicial review relative to
that afforded to other parties who contest citations.
Since the Conversion Statute arbitrarily discriminates against
Merit by allowing the Division to deprive them of rights available
to other similarly situated parties, the statute denies Merit its
right to equal protection under the law.

Merit accordingly asks

this Court to vacate the Conversion Order because it constitutes an
agency action based on a statute that "is unconstitutional on its
face or as applied."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(a) (1993).
CONCLUSION

By converting Merit's hearing to a formal adjudication, the
Division has engaged in an unlawful procedure by failing to follow
144442
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its own procedural rules that require an informal hearing for
contested citation hearings.

The Division's claim to convert by

the discretion granted in the Conversion Statute is erroneous
because the Division forfeited that discretion when it promulgated
the rule mandating an informal hearing for contested citations.
Furthermore, the Conversion Order fails to meet the two statutory
requirements set out in the Conversion Statute.

First, the

Conversion Order fails the public interest requirement because the
presiding officer justified the Conversion Order on the illusory
notion that additional procedures are necessary to adjudicate the
instant case. However, an informal proceeding with an evidentiary
hearing already provides him all the additional procedures that he
seeks.

Secondly, conversion fails to satisfy the no prejudice

requirement

because

it

allows

the

Division

to

contravention of its own prescribed proceedings.

convert

in

Finally, the

Conversion Statute violates Merit's right to equal protection
because it permits the Division to create two classes, one that
receives a mandated

informal hearing with two-level

judicial

review, and one that receives a formal hearing with single-level
judicial review.

Because the statute fails to provide sufficient

criteria for distinguishing which parties obtain a particular
track, it unfairly and arbitrarily classifies parties contesting
citations.

By applying the Conversion Statute in this case, the

presiding officer deprived Merit of equal protection by denying it
the opportunity to adjudicate its case informally.
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Accordingly,

Merit respectfully asks this Court to vacate the Conversion Order
and to remand this case for an informal agency adjudication.
DATED this

&

day of December, 1994.

JAMES B. LEE
BARBARA K. POLICH
WILLIAM J. STILLING
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

u

day of December, 1994,

I caused to be delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing PETITIONERS1 BRIEF, to:
Robert K. Hunt
Utah Assistant Attorney General
111 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0810

N / 0 ^ 7 hcj[

144442

36

c^

S\

r^-^J^j

Tab A

I IL-U.LS
Utah Court of Appeals

SEP 0 2 1994
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WILLIAM J. STILLING (6339)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioners
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

Marilyn M. Branch
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
* * * * * * * *

MERIT ELECTRICAL &
INSTRUMENTATION, a
corporation, and JONATHAN CARL
JURETICH, CHRISTOPHER M.
SCHIFFMAN, DAN A. JOHNSON, and
KIT VANESS,
Petitioners,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Citation Nos. 1846, 1841,
1917, 1918 and 1842
(Consolidated)
COURT OF APPEALS # 940435-CA

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING,
Respondent.

* * * * * * * *

P e t i t i o n e r s submit t h i s Memorandum in response t o t h i s c o u r t ' s
Notice of Consideration For Summary Disposition pursuant t o Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure 10(e).

P e t i t i o n e r s urge t h i s court t o

consider t h e i r P e t i t i o n for Review on i t s merits because the court
has j u r i s d i c t i o n

to

review the propriety

of

the Division

of

Occupational and Professional Licensing Order Converting C i t a t i o n
to Formal Adjudicative Proceeding ("Conversion Order"). 1
1

Two orders are currently at i s s u e . P e t i t i o n e r s are appealing
Department of Commerce's Order on Review, issued on June 27, 1994, and
underlying Conversion Order. They a c t u a l l y seek j u d i c i a l r e l i e f from
Conversion Order, and w i l l refer t o the Conversion Order as the subject of
appeal throughout t h i s Memorandum.
127674

the
the
the
the

INTRODUCTION
This

court

requested

the

parties

to

submit

memoranda

addressing whether it has jurisdiction to review the underlying
order in this case because the order at first glance appears to
lack finality as that term is applied in Barney v. Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing. 828 P.2d 542 (Utah App.
1992) . The Barney court refused to review an administrative order
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss because the order was not
final.

The petitioners in that case did not raise, nor did the

court discuss, whether the order was final under the Collateral
Order Doctrine.
The Collateral Order Doctrine is a well established, practical
construction of the final order rule that allows a court to review
orders that finally determine important rights of a party when the
issues are separate from the underlying action and would escape
review

if the court

adjudicated.

waits

until

the

entire

case

is fully

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp, 337 U.S. 541,

545, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26 (1949).

A court can review orders as

final under the Doctrine if they: " [1] conclusively determine the
disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue [3] completely
separate from the merits of the action, and [4] [are] effectively
unreviewable

on appeal

from

a

final

judgment."

Nixon v.

Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 731, 742, 102 S.Ct. 2690 (1982).
In this case, Petitioners challenge a Division order, that
converts a hearing for citations from an informal to a formal

127674
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proceeding.2

Conversion violates Petitioners' due process rights

because the Division's own rule, see Utah Admin. Code R156-46b202(1) (m)
Insofar

(1994),
as

the

designates
Utah

citation

Administrative

hearings
Procedures

as informal.3
Act

affords

Petitioners a right to de novo district court review for informal
agency proceedings, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1993) , but only
provides for limited review of formal proceedings, see Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1993), the Division's violation of its own rule
deprives Petitioners of their right to a trial de novo in district
court.

Moreover,

the Division's

conversion

establishes two

procedurally distinct tracks for adjudicating citations. Since the
Division's own rules have established citation hearings as informal
proceedings, the conversion produces an inconsistent operation of
the law, thereby depriving Petitioners of equal protection under
the law.

See Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993).

If Petitioners are forced to go forward with a formal hearing,
they will participate in the very proceeding that violates their
constitutional rights without ever having an opportunity to present
2

The Division purports to be acting pursuant to its authority under
Utah Code 63-46b-4, which reads in pertinent part:
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any
adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer may
convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal
adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative
proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public
interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly
prejudice the rights of any party.
3
While the Division has provided the Director with discretion
concerning the informal designation in other sections of Rule 156-46b-202, see.
e.g. . id. at (q) , it has not provide the Director with the same discretion with
respect to contested citation hearings.
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their constitutional arguments to an appellate court. Accordingly,
the Division's order to convert the proceedings is a final order
under the Collateral Order Doctrine because it finally determines
Petitioners' constitutional rights, which are entirely separate
from the merits of the citations and which are unreviewable once
Petitioners are forced to proceed formally.

Therefore, this court

has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2) (a) & 6346b-16 because the order that petitioners appeal is final.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.

On

or about

December

9,

1993,

the

Division

issued

citations to Merit Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc. and four
employees (collectively referred to as "Petitioners") alleging that
Merit hired unlicensed electricians to perform work in connection
with a refinery modernization project owned by Kennecott Copper and
that the named employees engaged in electrical contracting work
without licenses or without exemption from licensure.
2.

Petitioners contest the citations because the electrical

work at the site is exempt under Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-305(2)
(1993), which exempts

form licensure

"construction and repair

relating to . . . metal and coal mining."
3.

Division rules designate hearings for contested citations

as informal and provide no discretion to the Division to change.
See Utah Admin. Code R156-46b-202 (1) (m) .
4.

On April

5, 1994, the

Conversion Order.
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Presiding Officer issued

the

5.

On May 5, 1994, Petitioners filed a Request for Review of

the Conversion Order on the bases that, in light of the Division's
own rule that designates citation hearings as informal, conversion
to a formal proceeding: (i) violates Petitioners' right to due
process insofar as the Conversion Order precludes de novo review by
a district court and a hearing conducted under the Utah Rules of
Evidence and (ii) deprives Petitioners of equal protection because
conversion produces an inconsistent operation of law, whereby
Petitioners forfeit rights embodied in the informal process. See
Memorandum in Support of Request for Review attached as Exhibit A;
and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay attached as Exhibit B.
6.

On

Department

June
of

27, 1994, the

Commerce

issued

Executive

an

Order

Director

of the

Review

denying

on

Petitioners' Request for Review of the Conversion Order and
remanded the proceedings to the Division.
7.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the Utah

Court of Appeals on July 27, 1994 initiating the instant appeal,
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE CONVERSION ORDER
BECAUSE THE CONVERSION ORDER IS FINAL UNDER THE COLLATERAL
ORDER DOCTRINE.
A.

The Collateral Order Doctrine Is A Practical Construction
Of The Final Order Rule To Achieve Justice.

This court has jurisdiction to review the Conversion Order
under

Barney

v.

Division

of

Occupational

and

Professional

Licensing. 828 P.2d 542 (Utah App. 1992), because the Collateral
Order

Doctrine

requirement.
127674

is
The

entirely
Doctrine

consistent
is
"5-

an

with

established

the

finality

principle of

jurisprudence that permits courts to review orders "which finally
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent

of

the

cause

itself

to

require

that

appellate

consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.. 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct.
1221 (1949).
must:

To qualify for review under the Doctrine, an order

"[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2]

resolve an important issue [3] completely separate from the merits
of the action, and [4] [be] effectively unreviewable on appeal from
a final judgment."

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742, 102

S.Ct. 2690.
The United States Supreme Court first announced the Doctrine
because it was faced with the finality requirement imposed by 28
U.S.C. § 1291. In Cohen, the Court reviewed a district court order
denying application of a state statute, which required shareholders
bringing a derivative action to provide security for litigation
costs.

According to the Court,

28 U.S.C. § 1291 required that

"[s]o long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive,
there may be no appeal."

Id. at 546; Compare Barney. 828 P.2d at

544 ("an order of [an] agency is not final so long as it reserves
something for the agency for further decision."). Nonetheless, the
Court refused to rigidly apply the finality requirement because
once a final judgment on the merit is concluded, "it will be too
late effectively to review the present order and the rights
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conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost,
probably irreparably."

Cohen. 457 U.S. at 546.

After forty-five years, the Supreme Court still applies the
Doctrine, "not as an exception to the 'final decision' rule, but as
a 'practical construction' of it." Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop
Direct.

Inc. . 62 U.S.L.W.

4457, 4458

(U.S. June

6,

1994).

Therefore, federal and state courts continue to review a
"narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation,
but must, in the interest of 'achieving a healthy legal system,'
nonetheless be treated as 'final'" Id. . 62 U.S.L.W. at 4458; see,
e.g. . Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 11,
103 S.Ct. 927 (1983) (district court order to stay respondent's
action seeking order to compel arbitration was reviewable under the
Doctrine); United States v. Deffenbauah Indus.. 957 F.2d 749 (10th
Cir. 1992) (discovery order denying defendant access to grand jury
record appealable under the Doctrine); In re Newport Savings and
Loans Ass'n. 928 F.2d 472, 474-75 (1st Cir. 1991) (court reviewed
the district court's refusal to grant "leave" to foreclose upon a
mortgage, despite the fact that the forfeiture proceeding under the
"drug money" statute was still in progress) ; R.W. v. Hampe. 626
A.2d 1218 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (order partially sealing the record
in medical malpractice case reviewable under the Doctrine).
Precisely

the same

judicial policies

that underpin the

Doctrine in other jurisdictions require application of the Doctrine
to agency proceedings in Utah. Parties to agency proceedings have
no explicit right to appeal important questions that will escape
127674
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review once a final decision on the merits is entered.
the Utah

Rules

of Appellate

Procedure

Rule 18 of

specifically

precludes

parties to an agency adjudication from seeking a discretionary
appeal under Rule 5.

Thus, while the Doctrine is unnecessary to

protect important rights of civil litigants who have access to a
discretionary
available

appeal

route,

to parties

in

the

an

Doctrine

agency

is

the

adjudication

only
for

means

securing

judicial relief from rulings on important rights that escape review
upon final judgment.
874

P. 2d

119

See

(Utah

Tyler v. Department of Human Services.

1994)

(Collateral

Order

Doctrine

is

not

applicable when a party can seek discretionary appellate review
pursuant to Rule 5).

Accordingly, this court should not woodenly

apply

doctrine,

the

finality

but

rather

should

utilize

the

Collateral Order Doctrine as a means to effect justice in a manner
consistent with the finality doctrine articulated in Barney.
B.

The Conversion Order Satisfies All Requirements 0£ The
Collateral Order Doctrine.

The Conversion Order is reviewable as a final order because
it satisfies every requirement of the Collateral Order Doctrine.
As noted above, an order is reviewable as final if it:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

conclusively determines the disputed question;
resolves an important issue;
is completely separate from the merits of the action; and
is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
decision on the merits.

Nixon. 457 U.S. at 742.
Application of requirements one and three to the instant case
is unquestionable.

The Conversion Order conclusively determines

the question of whether Petitioners have a right to an informal
127674
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hearing in accordance with the Division's own rule, Utah Admin.
Code R156-46b-202 (1) (m) , designating citation hearings as informal.
Moreover, the constitutional issues at the heart of the question
are completely separate from the merits of the citations.
With respect to the second requirement, the Conversion Order
conclusively

resolves

important

constitutional

issues.

The

Conversion Order deprives Petitioners of due process by removing
them from an agency mandated forum that permits de novo review in
district court as a matter of statutory right. See. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-15 (1993) . As a result, Petitioners are forced through a
formal proceeding, which strips them of the right to seek review in
the district court, and instead leaves them with a more limited
review by appeal to this court.

Id. at §63-46b-16; see Town of

Chesapeake Beach v. Pessoa Const. Co., 625 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Md.
1993) (order denying stay of arbitration was important for purposes
of the Doctrine because

fl

[i]f the parties are incorrectly forced

into the wrong forum, the loss to each may be significant").
Moreover, the Division has deprived Petitioners of equal protection
under the law because conversion to a formal proceeding, in the
face of a rule designating citation hearings as informal, produces
inconsistent operation of the law -- some parties to citation
hearings receive
limited review.

fuller judicial review and others receive only
Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993). If

this court refuses to review these issues, the Division becomes the
de facto final arbiter of Petitioners' constitutional rights. Such

127674
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a

result

is entirely

at

odds with

the proper

role

of an

administrative agency.
Finally, the Conversion Order meets the fourth requirement for
application of the Doctrine --

that the decision be effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a decision on the merits -- because
once Petitioners enter the formal proceeding, their options for
seeking judicial relief are fixed.4

The effect of the Conversion

Order is to force Petitioners to contest the citations through a
formal adjudicatory proceeding despite the Division's own rule that
such hearings are designated as informal.
R156-46b-202(1) (m) .

See Utah Admin. Code

Thus, without review by this court, the

Petitioners will be forced to participate in the very proceeding
from which they seek relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court has jurisdiction to
review the Petition for Review on its merits and this Court should
therefore order briefing of the issues underlying the Petition.
DATED this Q

day of September, 1994.

JAMES B. H^EE
<7
BARBARA -K. POLICH
WILLIAM J. STILLING
of and for
Attorneys for Petitioners
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

4

This is particularly poignant because discretionary appeal through Rule 5
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure is foreclosed- Thus, refusal by this Court
to hear the Petition slams shut the only door open to Petitioners for appellate
review.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

Q

day of September,

1994, I caused to be hand-delivered, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY DISPOSITION to:

Robert K. Hunt
Utah Assistant Attorney General
111 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0810
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

In the Matter of:
MERIT ELECTRICAL & INSTRUMENTATION, a corporation, and
JONATHAN CARL JURETICH,
CHRISTOPHER M. SCHIFFMAN, DAN
A. JOHNSON, and KIT VANESS
CARSON, individuals,
Respondents.

REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF ORDER
CONVERTING CITATION TO
FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS DATED APRIL 5, 1994
Citation Nos. 1846, 1841,
1917, 1918
and 1842
(Consolidated)

* * * * * * * *

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12, Respondents
seek review of the Order Converting Citation to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings dated April 5, 1994, which Order was entered by
Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer.
The Order is appealed on the grounds that: 1) the
Division has no authority to convert a citation hearing to a
formal proceeding because it has specifically classified
contested citation hearings as informal proceedings; 2) even if
the Division has authority to convert the proceedings, the

criteria of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) have not been met
insofar as converting the proceeding on the above-referenced
citations is not in the public interest and will cause unfair
prejudice to the rights of Respondents; and 3) the Division's
conversion order is an attempt to engage in impermissible
rulemaking.
A memorandum in support of this petition is filed
contemporaneously with the filing of the petition and is
incorporated herein.
DATED this 5th day of May, 1994.
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

Barbara K. Polich

108693

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of May, 1994, I
caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF ORDER
CONVERTING CITATION TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS DATED
APRIL 5, 1994, to:
Robert K. Hunt
Utah Assistant Attorney General
111 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0810
aud a copy to be hand delivered, in addition to the copy mailed,
on the same date to:
Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer
Bureau of Investigations
DOPL Construction Trades Licensing Section
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
William S. Essex, Jr., Supervisor
Bureau of Investigations
DOPL Construction Trades Licensing Section
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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JAMES B. LEE (1919)
BARBARA K. POLICH (2620)
WILLIAM J. STILLING (6339)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondents
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

In the Matter of:
MERIT ELECTRICAL & INSTRUMENTATION, a corporation, and
JONATHAN CARL JURETICH,
CHRISTOPHER M. SCHIFFMAN, DAN
A. JOHNSON, and KIT VANESS
CARSON, individuals,
Respondents.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF
ORDER CONVERTING CITATION
TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
Citation Nos. 1846, 1841
1917, 1918 and 1842
(Consolidated)

* * * * * * * *

This Memorandum is submitted in support of Respondents'
petition for review of the April 5, 1994 order converting the
hearing for the above-captioned citations to formal adjudication.
INTRODUCTION
The Presiding Officer in this case acted beyond his
authority when he entered an Order Converting Citation to Formal
Adjudication Proceedings

("Conversion Order") because the Utah

Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4
(1993), does not authorize conversions in cases, such as this one,
where the Division of Occupational and Professional

Licensing

("Division") has by rule specifically designated an adjudication as

informal.

Even if the Presiding Officer has discretion to convert

designated

hearings, his

Conversion

conversion

in this case does not

Order

satisfy

is

invalid

the dual

because

statutory

requirements that the conversion must "be in the public interest"
and that the conversion "does not unfairly prejudice the right of
any party."

Id. at (3).

The Presiding Officer's claim that he

requires more expansive procedures is not in the public interest,
and is, in fact, contrary to the public interest.

Moreover, the

conversion unfairly deprives the Respondents of their due process
rights to a hearing conducted under the Utah Rules of Evidence and
Rules of Civil Procedure.
a

two

track

procedural

In addition, the conversion establishes
system,

and

arbitrarily

relegates

Respondents to a track that treats them unfairly, thereby violating
their rights to equal protection under the law.
process

Erosion of due

and violation of equal protection not only

Respondents specifically, but harm the public generally.

prejudice
Finally,

the conversion to a formal proceeding in this case is simply a
mechanism for converting the adjudication to de facto rulemaking.
For each of the reasons, the Conversion Order must be reversed and
Order For a Return to Informal Adjudication should be entered.

PROCEDURAL SETTING
On

or

about

December

9,

1993, the

Division

issued

citations to Merit Electrical and Instrumentation, Inc. ("Merit")
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and

four

employees

(collectively

referred

to

hereinafter

as

"Respondents") alleging violations of the Utah Construction Trades
Licensing Act.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-1 et sea. (1993).

The

Division claims that Merit violated § 58-55-2(32)(c) of the Act by
hiring unlicensed

and non-exempt

electricians

as employees to

perform electrical construction work in connection with a refinery
modernization project owned by Kennecott Utah Copper, located near
Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Division claims that each of the

individual respondents violated § 58-55-2(32)(a) by engaging in a
construction trade requiring

a license

licensed or exempted from licensure.

(electrical) while not

All respondents contest the

citations because the electrical work at the site is "construction
and repair relating

to

. . . metal and coal mining"

and is

therefore exempt from licensure under Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-6(2)
(1993).
All respondents timely filed notice with the Division
contesting the citations. Each respondent denied violating the Act
and requested a hearing in accordance with the UAPA, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-l, et seq.. and the applicable rules at Utah Admin. Code
R156-46b-l, et seq.

Despite the classification of hearings to

contest citations as informal proceedings under R156-46b-202 (1) (m),
the Division, on February 11, 1994, filed a Motion to Convert to
Formal Adjudicative Proceedings ("Motion to Convert").

That same

day, the Presiding Officer granted the Division's motion and issued
109856
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an Order Converting Citation to Formal Adjudicative Proceeding.
Respondents timely filed an objection to the Division's motion and
the Presiding Officer's order.

In response, the presiding officer

vacated his order on March 4, 1994. After both parties submitted
further responsive pleadings, the Presiding Officer conducted a
hearing on the Motion to Convert on March 28, 1994. On April 5,
1994, the Presiding Officer

issued a second Order

Converting

Citation to Formal Adjudication Proceeding ("Conversion Order").
A Notice of Hearing was issued by the Division the same day, which
set the formal adjudication of the citations for May 25, 1994.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12, Respondents timely seek
review of the Conversion Order and this Memorandum is in support of
that Request for Review.
Respondents incorporate all arguments presented to the
Presiding Officer in prior pleadings and present new arguments as
follows.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DIVISION HAS NO AUTHORITY TO CONVERT A CITATION
HEARING TO A FORMAL
PROCEEDING BECAUSE
IT HAS
SPECIFICALLY CLASSIFIED CONTESTED CITATION HEARINGS AS
INFORMAL PROCEEDINGS.
The Division cannot convert a proceeding, which it has

specifically designated by rule as informal, to a formal hearing
because it has no statutory or regulatory discretion to do so.
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4, which the Division relies on to convert
I; I i •>•!c i La L J,„on f 11"oc*•.'ediny s , pr ov i d e s i

(1) The agency may, by rule,
designate categories of adjudicative
proceedings
to
be
conducted
informally
according
to
the
procedures
set forth in rules
enacted under the authority of this
chapter
(2) Subject to the provisions of
Subsection
f 3),
all
agency
proceedings
not
specifically
designated as informal proceedings
by the agency's rules shall be
conducted formally in accordance
with the requirements
of this
chapter.
(3) Any time before a final order :i s
issued
in
any
adjudicative
proceeding, the presiding officer
may convert a formal adjudicative
proceeding
to
an
informal
adjudicative
proceeding,
or
an
informal adjudicative proceeding to
a formal adjudicative proceeding if:
(a) conversion
proceeding
is
in
public interest; and
(b) conversion
proceeding
does
unfairly prejudice
rights of any party.
v

(emphasis added)

t.1

„solatic :

not
the
subsectior

tppears

;ji „

1

edin .

sections are read as a whole,

becomes apparent that subsection

(3) serves solely
sub s e c t i on i, „ | ,
109856

modify default proceedings delineated In

i
5

ciesj qnat i'M'1 hear ,i nqs, it would have made subsect
"subject

to the provisions

subsection

.

Co m m ' ,
omissior

ot Subsection

{ '\) ,

T.

)

as

h

C f . Maverik Country S t o r e s , I n c . v . Industrial

r.zu y * * , ?*/

^u^a.

, : or- reference t o a

(concluding
-

statute evidences legislative intent) . Si rice the Division
»f R u ] e 1 5 6 - 4 6 b - 2 0 2 ( l ) ( m ) , h a s specifically designated
c itat ion

h earings

Presiding

Officer

as

that

in £ o i: m a ]

a c:i j 1 i d i c a !:::, I v e

acted beyond h i s authority

present adjudication to a formal proceeding.

by w a y

contested

:> c e e d i n g s ,

the

converting t h e
?ee State ex r e l .

Department of community Affairs v. Utah M m it System. C o m icil , 6 ] 4
P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980) (holding procedural rules "cannot be ignored
or followed by the agency to su i t :i ts own p u r p o s e s " ) .
Legi s] atn i c i n Hiiarf i nq Utah Code A n n .
§ 63-46b-£ "

designate a proceeding as formal

providing

conversion

*

apparent

only
,

in subsection

Informal, w h i l e
proceedings, Is
a o n hcis,

M--,,.-

as

p r e v i o u s l y , designated contested

citato.,

Utah A d m i n , R156-46b-202 (1) (m)

Jowever

-.:.' *. ,:i.

designa* . .- citation hearings as

nforma]

* ••• Divisic :

T+O

109856

experience

with

ci tati oi: i 1 le .

u

noted

hearings as informal.

-

merely

.

' . . . ed
ai

nature of citation hearings,- *:\d. required by rule that evidentiary
hear ings be cundurl:*- :.»•-.
wh lie

the Division

: -

ions are contested

'..:• •• provided

the Director

Additi onal ly f
with

discretion

concerning the informal designation i n other sections of Rule 156e»g
with

r

:i d

at (q) ,, i t has i i- : t pi: ov i < lie the Di rec itor

* . *- - :v t discretion

with

*-\H provision for

hearings

respect

' > contested

ci tation

evidentiary hearing demonstrates

recugnlt i on 1

' u 1.1 infnrmal heai ing Is no

necessary, but is also sufficient to resolve contested citato .
To

allow

the Division

(,)Hi i: 1:1 c u ,1 a r

cas<

to arbitrarily
«: a r e fu,1 ] y

change
crafting

i ts

mind

the

;

procedural

requirements for contested citations woi '^ ni illifv the rulemaking
embodied In Rti le 156-46b-202.
The UAPA does not provide the Presiding Officer with
authority to convert the nroceedings i n tl: le presen
informal

adjudication.

Conversion

Order

is, therefore,

invalid.

Under the Construction Trades Licensing Act, the peculiar situation arises where the person cited
has the burden to prove their innocence because a violation is presumed unless a citation is contested. Utah Code
Ann. § 58-55-13(4)(a)(i) (1993). The Division designated contested citation hearings as informal in light of this
statutory framework. Therefore, a contested citation hearing is designed to protect the rights of the person cited,
and has no public interest implication. To implicate public interest in a contested citation hearing would undermine
the Respondents' opportunity to afford themselves the protections under the Division's rules.
It is noteworthy that the division designated twenty procedures as informal under R156-46b202(1), but only required evidentiary hearings for two types of proceedings, one of which is a contested citation
hearing. Obviously, the Division recognized that citations often present comphcated factual issues and mandated
more rigorous procedures than are typically required for informal adjudications under the UAPA.
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II.

EVEN IF THE DIVISION HAS AUTHORITY TO CONVERT THE
PROCEEDINGS, THIS CASE FAILS TO MEET THE STANDARDS SET
FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46B-4(3).
Even if the Divisic: ' *

proceeding,

onverting

the

k

;1

' ' :'4

Ltation

-*-:

.vr-t the

hearing

formal

; . : • : .

public interest
Utah Code A n n

e

unfairly prejudices Respondents
: 63-46b-4(3) provider

:T

\^

. :; *. .

tne Presiding
<i formal

Of I: icei: may ("onvei:' an informal ad
proceeding only if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is
in the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding
does not unfairly prejudice the
rights of any party.

Despite the UAPA requirement that both conditions for conversion be
ii'iei (l ir 1"i » Presiding

Officer's

decision

to convert

this

hearing

satisfies neither.

The decision to convert is not in the public

interest because a formal proceeding does not enhance the Presiding
Officer's ability to decide the determinat ive Issues,
c o n ve r s I

mi

Hp

Moreover,

i ) n d e 111, s

• ::: f t h e

substantive procedural rights embodied in a district court trial,
and violates their right• ' > equal protection by depriving them of
t. h•:•* s a n i e
other

similarly

« r ' ",i
situated

persons.

f.a t i o11«»• > i r• t r, \ in,j I 1 y »is

Accordingly,

Officer's Conversion Order must be reversed.
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the Presiding

THERE
IS 1 0 BASIS TO CONVERT T O A FORKAL
ADJUDICATION A S A MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST.

A.

Contrary t o the Presiding Officer's finding that a formal
adjudication
questio:

is necessary

adequate

proceedings

*<

I

procedural
"-^T t hu

;»
mechanisms

Presidinc

ssi

exis*

Cfficer

anaer
__

n

informal

gather

facts

wi Il 'JM e

r - -

According to t h e Presiding O f f i c e r , t h e public interest
w a r r a n t s a formal hearing because t h e issues surrounding t h e c i t a t:i 01 is
are highly disputed in what m a y b e a
novel interpretation of t h e facts
and l a w w h i c h m a y require t h e cross
examination of witnesses and require
submittal of rebuttal evidence in
order t o fully address t h e issues in
the c a s e , and m a y require t h e
expertise
of
the
contractors
licensing board.
(

I L J.

additional

procedural

A s explained belo^
mechanisms

*

desired,

a r e necessa:

>r

informal a d j u d i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s , t h e UAPA provides a n ample p r o c e dural

armamentarium

for resolving

whether

• •*

Respondents'
s i nq /\rt, •

T h e Presiding Officer already possesses significant a n d
sufficient authority under t h e UAPA - .* gather
*,M ' " "" '

unlik-
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the necessary

:

' • I,,ur.,ina 1 a d jud i<

-

ajority

of

informal
9

»,

adjudications

(

- -

contested

citations.

Moreover..

•-..•-•

-.

See Utah Admin, (Viae H J b r'i •• 4 tj L>—*1 iH i, "i | n. i t .
explicitly

(1993

on

provides parties
: \?u*

ad judication hearir : •*-•• -. - ^
am I comment

requires evidentiary hearings for

J_ICJLL-L_

to an informal

;

'-- "testify, present evi dence,

• -

(] )(c)

Accordingly, parties can provide t h e Presiding
information

at their

disposal

Officer

to advocate

their

P°:As the Presiding Officer noted i n his Conversion O r d e r ,
factual determination *r *:u - matter involves "the relationship
•

vidence
interpre*

necessar}

- \ - mining exemptic

-„: v,
- -,

ra-

Presiding

Off.; -:

o

a* --*. § 58-^5-6(2)
>arties

themselves

T

are

evidence pertaining

...

: * levant

• whether work at the site relates to mining.

r i m e s ' abilitv '
entirei

presen

*JOS.\:.

Drovide a 11 relevant evidence,
- '}resj ding 01" t icer. to solicit

nnecessary for

evidence from outside sources through a formal procedure.
Presidir

fficer

believe-

-

parties

will

If t h e

inadequately
y

autho:; \ \

subpoenas

: <r nei orders *

of necessary evidence. ' Id. at ( e ) . •
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compel production

K

it is unnecessary for f" he parties to have t h e

right t o cr„.^ -examine witnesses as the l'"r

cer cl a i :uts .

Nothing in t h e procedures for an informal adjudication prevents t h e
Presiding Officer from questioning the parties i f he feels the need
to

under*-' -1 ic:i

11

. ' ence

moi:e

fu 1 ] y

Gi vei 1 the P i e s i.d iri g

Officer's authority to question the p a r t i e s , it i s 1: lard to imagine
*
\.

- -v. Presiding Officer - ability
-.

s

adjudicate t h e citations
^ i ies *

cross-examine witnesses .
t r :ross-examination

t:o

present rebuttal evidence,

The light

therefore superfluous for t h e p u r p o s e of

<

acts and

accordingly
Similarly
e.xpeii t :i
addressed through

public interest implication.
lf

Presiding Officer's claimed need for the
••

censing board c a n b e adequately

mforma

roceeding.

T h e Iiirecluu,

I the

Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing h a s authority
t.i'i designate "an individual or body of individuals to conduct or to
assist t h e director in conductinc
cative proceeding."1"1

Utah Cjdt* *'

d i r e c t o r believes that 1
""'" '" ""'" ' ijift i.equ i„,i e I he e,xp--

><•--.•*<

issues surrounding
. ••

'

.2: designate that boarc tr assist
informal adjudicative proceeding.

i

±±

^

.\>.;-e

resolution

-.

•

i,

is: Presiding Officer during
In e s s e n c e , t h e Board c a n
, n c:ij" (,) f" f „i c e i
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C o n s e q 11 e 111, "I y ,

a forma] proceed :i i 1 j offers absolutely no additional opportunity for
the Presiding Officer to utili ze the expertise «
Licensing Board.
In
gathering r>ov
to convert

Officer f c

^residing
• *

*

inherent

isi s as a matter «

formal adjudication.

Thus*,

fact

.'

• •• "

ailing

*.;•--

::.:

requirement for conversion under the LA__, _..u Conversion Order

B.

CONVERTING
TO
A
FORMAL
ADJUDICATION
IS
IMPERMISSIBLE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46B-4(3)
BECAUSE
CONVERSION
UNFAIRLY
PREJUDICES
THE
RESPONDENTS' RIGHTS.

Allowing the Division

?

arbitrarily and

capriciously

otection
process issues
created

two

protect i ons.

,- instant case
procedural
The

tracks

Dj_vj_s-[ori

essence,
with

appears

have

due

*e Division has

different
to

and

rights

s m y i e -.

and
^

Respondents for a more costly and cumbersome track, whi
less procedural protections.

Conversion of the citation hearing

an informal adjudical : • deprives Respondents' of their rights to
a de novo . -.Rules

r

r:

•
1.

•

d! undtM

\\w

Mt.ili Huh.11

\\\

I1 ,M i dence ..uiid

' rocedure, as embodied in I he informal scheme,
Conversion Violates Respondents' Due Process Rights

Conversi on
because i t deprives then of procedural safeguards guaranteed under
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UAPA and the Utah Administrative Code.

Respondents' due process

rights are implicated in this case because courts "first look to
relevant

statutes"

to

determine

what

protection

due

process

requires in a particular case. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,
1169 (Utah 1988); see also State ex rel. Department of Community
Affairs v. Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980)
(holding procedural rules "cannot be ignored or followed by the
agency to suit its own purposes").
The Utah Administrative Code provides that a "contested
citation hearing held in accordance with subsection 58-55-13(4) "is
classified as an informal adjudicative proceeding.
Rule 156-46b-202(l)(m) (1994).

Utah Admin.

Parties seeking judicial relief

from an informal proceeding have a right to a de novo trial in the
district court governed by the Utah Rules of Evidence, see Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1) (a) & (3)(b) (1993), which prohibit the use
of hearsay and irrelevant evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 402 and 802.
Conversion to a formal adjudication would deprive Respondents of
their right to receive a hearing where hearsay and irrelevant
evidence

are

excluded

because,

contrary

to

the

Division's

assertions otherwise, formal adjudications are not governed by the
Utah Rules of Evidence.

See Division's Response to Motion and

Order at 4; Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Convert at 6-7.
In fact, during a formal hearing, the UAPA explicitly
permits the use of evidence which would be excluded under the Utah
109856
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Rules of Evidence.

For example, the UAPA mandates

that the

"presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is
hearsay."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(1)(c) (1993).

If the citation

is adjudicated under formal proceedings, Respondents would acquire
the right to cross-examine witnesses, but would be unable to
effectively utilize their right because, by definition, hearsay
evidence cannot be cross-examined.

The procedural safeguard of

cross-examination, which the Presiding Officer relied on so heavily
in his Conversion Order, would offer Respondents no protection
against hearsay evidence.

In light of the fact that third parties

can more easily intervene in a formal proceeding than under Rule 24
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the inevitable intervention
by groups not a party to the citation proceeding magnifies the
Respondents' dilemma.

Not only will they be faced with hearsay

evidence that becomes part of the only factual record available for
appellate review, but they must face the onslaught of such evidence
from a multitude of intervenors who will attempt to flood the
proceedings with evidence, hearsay and otherwise, to support their
own agendas.
In the same vein, irrelevant material may taint the
record under a formal proceeding. While the "presiding officer may
exclude

evidence

that

is

irrelevant,

immaterial,

repetitious," there is no mandate that he must do so.
Ann. § 63-46b-8(l)(b)(i) (1993).
109856
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or

unduly

Utah Code

Contrast the UAPA's permissive

language with the Utah Rules of Evidence: "Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible."

Utah R. Evid. 402. Like the problem

with

of

hearsay,

intervention

outside

parties

amplifies

potential for introduction of irrelevant evidence.

the

Not only will

Respondents lose the right to exclude irrelevant evidence, but the
expense they

incur in trying to fend off such evidence

numerous parties will increase dramatically.

from

Although an increase

in defense costs alone might not amount to unfair prejudice of
Respondents' rights, increased defense costs, in conjunction with
deprivation of due process rights, certainly rises to the level of
unfair prejudice.
If Respondents have an opportunity to develop a new
record

before

a

trial

court,

the

problems

inadmissible evidence would evaporate.

with

hearsay

and

The de novo trial would be

conducted under the Utah Rules of Evidence and a new record can be
developed which is free from irrelevant evidence and hearsay.
However, once a formal procedure occurs, the Division deprives
Respondents of their opportunity to develop a new record.
While a formal hearing may be a "trial-type" proceeding,
see Kirk v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing,
815 P.2d 242, 245 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the due process protections
afforded by the formal proceeding fall far short of those available
in an actual de novo trial.

The Presiding Officer's conversion

will deprive Respondents of their due process rights and will
109856
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unfairly prejudice them. Accordingly, the Conversion Order should
be reversed,
2.

Conversion Violates Respondents' Right to Equal
Protection

Conversion to a formal proceeding violates Respondents'
rights to equal protection because it essentially establishes two
tracks for adjudicating citations, an informal track by designation
and a formal track by conversion.

Each of these tracks affords

Respondents with different procedural rights and safeguards from
other persons within the same class
citations).

(i.e., persons contesting

Because Respondents are members of a larger class,

equal protection mandates that they be treated the same as all
other members of the class.
Finance,

576

P.2d

State Tax Comm'n v. Department of

1297, 1298

(Utah

1978)

("Equal protection

protects against discrimination within a class.").

Because the

Respondents have "been singled out from among a larger class" of
persons

contesting

citations, the Division's

imposition

of

a

different set of procedures "must be considered to be arbitrary and
constitutionally prohibited."

Id.

The Respondents do not argue that either the formal or
informal proceedings are inherently defective.

Rather, they are

asserting that all persons similarly situated—anyone contesting
citations—should be afforded the same procedural rights.
once

109856
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proceeding
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designated

by

Thus,

rulemaking

as

informal, the Respondents, as well as all other similarly situated
persons contesting citations should be entitled to the rights
embodied in that informal adjudicatory process.

Any effort to

deprive Respondents of those rights because they are working for a.
large mining concern is particularly egregious.
In State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576
P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that the State
Tax Comm'n deprived the State Insurance Fund of equal protection
because it imposed a tax upon the Fund that was not imposed upon
private insurers.

The Court ruled that the Fund and the private

insurers all belonged to the same class, namely companies providing
workmen's compensation. Therefore, the tax imposed solely upon the
Fund was "arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited."

Id. at 1298.

Likewise, the Division in this case cannot arbitrarily
modify its own regulatory scheme and convert to a formal hearing.
To do so singles out Respondents, and deprives them of the right to
avail themselves of the protections embodied in the UAPA and the
Division's rules.

The conversion to a formal proceeding deprives

Respondents of equal protection and must therefore be reversed.

III.

THE DIVISION'S CONVERSION ORDER IS AN ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE
IN RULEMAKING
The Conversion Order is simply an effort to revive an

unsuccessful attempt to make rules restricting the mining exemption
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under the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act,

On October 15,

1993, the Division published a proposed rule that limited the
meaning of "related to metal and coal mining"—the very terms that
the Presiding Officer must apply to resolve the citations.
Utah State Bull. 93-20 at 8 (October 15, 1993).

See

After a public

hearing on the proposed rule, the Division abandoned the change
because

it

concluded

that

the

issue

was

best

left

to

the

Legislature. The conversion to a formal adjudication is an attempt
to accomplish by adjudication, what the Division itself concluded
could not be accomplished by rulemaking.3
A formal citation proceeding, with the likelihood of
intervention by a multitude of "interested" parties, would convert
the evidentiary hearing into a public hearing more akin to the
rulemaking process than adjudication.

Moreover, third parties

would infuse the hearings with broad policy concerns that are
irrelevant to resolution of the citations.

As noted above, if

irrelevant evidence is admitted at the hearing, the Respondents
have no opportunity to correct the record.
The issue at hand for the Presiding Officer is whether
the Respondents activities at the site were related to mining. The
parties to this action are in the best position to provide evidence

The Division's efforts to promulgate a rule that limited the definition of related to "metal and coal
mining" severely taints its ability to impartially adjudicate the present case because it has essentially established its
position on the determinative question in this case.
109856
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necessary to determine the relatedness of the refinery site to
mining activities.

There is no need for the Division to engage in

de facto rulemaking to resolve the validity of the citations. The
Conversion Order should be overturned to prevent the Presiding
Officer not only from converting to a formal proceeding, but also
to prevent him from converting an adjudication into de facto
rulemaking.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Respondents request that
the Conversion Order be reversed and that the Division enter an
order setting a time for an informal hearing.

DATED this

3

day of May, 1994.

&^e- -

£~?«L, {^

JAMES B. LEE
BARBARA K. POLICH
WILLIAM J. STILLING
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondents

109856

19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

S

day of May, 1994, I

caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR
REVIEW

OF

ORDER

CONVERTING

CITATION

TO

FORMAL

ADJUDICATIVE

PROCEEDINGS
to:
Robert K. Hunt
Utah Assistant Attorney General
111 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0810
and a copy to be hand delivered, in addition to the copy mailed,
on the same date to:
Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer
Bureau of Investigations
DOPL Construction Trades Licensing Section
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
William S. Essex, Jr., Supervisor
Bureau of Investigations
DOPL Construction Trades Licensing Section
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

)&rt^ ^L
109856
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Darrel J. Bostwick (4543)
Jeffery R. Price (6315)
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
254 West 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7000
Fax: (801) 531-7060
Armin J. Moeller, Jr.
PHELPS DUNBAR
Suite 500 - Security Centre North
200 South Lamar Street
P.O. Box 23066
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066
Telephone: (601) 352-2500
Fax: (601) 360-9777
Attorneys for Respondents
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATE OF UTAH
In The Matter Of:
MERIT ELECTRICAL &
INSTRUMENTATION,
a corporation, and JONATHAN
CARL JURETICH, CHRISTOPHER M.
SCHIFFMAN, DAN A. JOHNSON, and
KIT VANESS CARSON, individuals,
Respondents.

:
:
:
::
::
:
:
:

OBJECTION TO MOTION AND
ORDER CONVERTING CONTEST
OF CITATIONS TO FORMAL
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDING
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING
Citation Nos. 1846, 1841
1917, 1918
and 1842
(consolidated)

Respondents, acting by and through their attorneys, hereby
object

to

the

Motion

of

Professional Licensing ("the

the

Division

of

Occupational

and

Division") to convert respondents'

contest of the above-referenced citations to a formal adjudicative
proceeding, and to the Order of the presiding officer granting that
motion dated February 11, 1994, and hereby request a hearing of the
Motion, Order and this Objection.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter arises from citations issued by the Division
asserting violations of the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act,
Utah Code Annotated §58-55-1 et sea, ("the Act").

On or about

December 9, 1993, the Division issued a citation to Merit Electric
& Instrumentation ("Merit"), under Section 58-55-2(32)(c) of the
Act claiming that Merit hired unlicensed and non-exempt electricians as employees to perform electrical construction work in
connection

with

the

refinery

modernization

project

owned

by

Kennecott Copper Corporation ("Kennecott"), located on Kennecott's
property near Salt Lake City, Utah. On that same day, the Division
issued citations to each of the individual respondents, asserting
that each violated Section 58-55-2(32)(a) of the Act by engaging in
a construction trade requiring trade licensure (electrical) while
not licensed or exempted from licensure.
Both Merit and its employees dispute the citations on the
basis that such work and employment are exempted from licensure
under Utah Code Annotated §58-55-6(2), Exemptions from Licensure.
Merit and each of the individual respondents timely filed an
appropriate notice with the Division contesting citations.

Each

(1) denied they violated the Act as asserted in the citations, and
(2) requested a hearing in accordance with the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act ("the UAPA"), Utah Code Annotated §63-46(b)-l et

2

seq.. and the Rules applicable to the Division under the UAPA ("the
Division Rules"). 1
Rule

156-46b-4(2)(d) of

the

Division

Rules

specifically

requires that any hearing held in conjunction with a challenge to
a citation issued under the Act be heard at the Division level as
an informal adjudicative proceeding. Under the UAPA, an agency may
move to convert an informal proceeding to a formal proceeding in an
appropriate case, but only where specific criteria are satisfied.
On or about February 11, 1994, the Division moved the presiding
officer to convert this matter to a formal proceeding under Utah
Code Annotated §63-46b-4(c).

That same day, the presiding officer

granted that motion and by Order dated February 11, 1994, converted
this matter to a formal adjudicative proceeding, subject to the
objection of respondents being filed within 20 days following the
date of the Order.

The respondents object to the conversion to a

formal proceeding, and this objection is timely filed.
The basis for respondents' objection is that none of the
required criteria have been met and, therefore, this matter is not
an appropriate case for conversion. The conversion of this matter,
if allowed, will
respondents

substantially

and

irreparably

prejudice

the

and undermine their right to both procedural and

substantive due process of law, and deny them the protections of
the procedural requirements of the UAPA and the Division's own
procedural rules. For the reasons set forth below, the respondents
1

The Division Rules relating to the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act are codified in the Utah Administrative Code §R15646b-l et seq.
3

object to the conversion of this matter from an informal proceeding
to a formal proceeding.

ARGUMENT
THE REQUISITES FOR CONVERSION TO A FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDING
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §63-46B-4(3) HAVE NOT IN FACT BEEN
SATISFIED SO THAT CONVERSION IS NOT PERMITTED NOR JUSTIFIED IN THIS
PARTICULAR MATTER.
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-4(3), the authority under which
the presiding officer has ordered the conversion of this matter to
a formal adjudicative proceeding requires the Division to show by
substantial evidence that (a) the conversion is in the public
interest, AND (b) that the conversion of the proceeding does not
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party. Without any hearing on
the matter, the presiding officer made a ruling converting this
matter which decision is not supported by any evidence of record
nor any fact relevant to the resolution of the subject challenges
to the citations on the refinery project.
1.

No Legitimate Public Interest will be Served by
Conversion of this Matter to a Formal Adjudicative
Proceeding.

At issue in this case is the narrow question of whether
Meritf s employees who do electrical trade work are required to be
licensed

by

the

Division

prior

to

engaging

construction work on the Kennecott refinery.

in

electrical

The determination of

that narrow legal issue depends only upon the application of the
Utah Legislature's express exemption from licensure stated in Utah
Code Annotated §58-55-6(2), of persons engaged in construction and
repair work related to metal mining, to the electrical work at the
4

refinery project. This case turns solely upon determining whether
the

refinery

is

"related

to"

Kennecott's

operation as stated in the exemption.

Utah

metal

mining

No person other than the

respondents and Kennecott have any "legal interest" whatsoever in
that determination. The mere curiosity regarding the resolution of
this matter by other purely political or economic interest groups
does not create an issue of public interest where none otherwise
exists.
Since the time the exemption was enacted in 1957, neither the
Division

nor

any

of

its previous

incarnations

have

required

construction tradesmen working at the refinery to be trade licensed
by the State of Utah.

That history irrebuttably demonstrates that

the public interest as expressed in the exemption has been served
and satisfied at the refinery site for nearly 40 years. The public
interest in this case requires and compels the,determination that
the citations be withdrawn and the matter closed without any
further proceedings.

The Division has made no showing that any

legitimate public interest is in issue in this matter, and there is
no basis for converting this matter to a formal adjudicative
proceeding.
2.

Therefore, the motion to convert should be denied.

Conversion of this Proceeding Will Unfairly Prejudice the
Rights of All Respondents.

The respondents in this matter, Merit and its employees, are
entitled to be treated like any other persons cited for violations
of the Act.

That is, they are entitled to contest the citations

relating to the specific project, and have no obligation to fund or
5

participate in litigation not related to the specific issues raised
in the citations. The Division's attempt to convert the proceeding
from informal to formal is for the express purpose of allowing
other parties to attempt to intervene and for the Division to
obtain an advisory decision regarding the full scope and extent of
the metal and coal mining exemption. The conversion of this matter
to a formal adjudicative proceeding by the Division is designed and
intended to expand the litigation to issues unrelated to the matter
of Merit and its employees, and to provide a political arena where
much broader and irrelevant questions relating to what the law
should or should not be may be addressed by parties who are
completely alien to this matter.

Such a formal proceeding will

degenerate to a debate on broad public policy topics which debate
is only appropriate for the legislative process.2
2

These public

In 1993, the Division published proposed rule changes
which attempted to narrow the statutory exemption for metal and
coal mining. On October 28, 1993, a hearing was held before the
Administrative Law Judge with regard to the proposed rule changes.
As a result of the discussion at the hearing, as well as the advice
of the Division's counsel, the proposed rule was withdrawn. At the
hearing, it was represented to the Administrative Law Judge that
the issue would be taken to the Utah legislature to attempt to
modify or narrow the exemption by statute. However, with the 1994
legislative general session just completed, there has been no
proposed legislation enacted or even introduced regarding the metal
and coal mining exemption from contractor or trade licensing.
Despite the withdrawal of the proposed rule and the failure to
introduce legislation regarding the exemption, the Division has
issued the citations to Merit and its employees based upon a
standard as stated in the aborted proposed rule; although that
standard is completely different from the standard used for
approximately 40 years with regard to the exemption.
In other
words, what the Division could not do or failed to do with the rule
making process and legislative process with regard to the
exemption, it has now chosen to do it be sheer force of
Administrative fiat. Although the exemption has not changed for
almost 40 years, the Division has chosen to enforce it in a
6

policy issues are irrelevant to the challenged citations at issue
in this matter.
covers

Merit

The only relevant issue is whether the exemption
and

its

employees

at

the

Kennecott

refinery

modernization project.
The conversion
proceeding

will

of

this matter

require

Merit

and

to a
its

formal

adjudicative

employees

to

incur

substantial expense in both time and money in order to contest the
citations and to deal with massive amounts of irrelevant and
inflammatory evidence relating to the political agenda of unions,
trade associations or others, geared toward coercing Kennecott into
an agreement to employ their members instead of the most effective
and efficient contractors and employees on the various Kennecott
projects.

That prejudice to respondents will be both real and

substantial.
The clear reason behind the motion to convert, is the desire
of the Division to provide a means whereby other parties might
intervene in this matter in order to initiate a debate as to what
the law ought to be relating to the application of the exemption,
rather than what the law is and has been for nearly 40 years.

The

Division, by converting this matter to a formal proceeding, is
intent

on

initiating

what

is

nothing

more

than

a

de

facto

Declaratory Order proceeding which is binding upon respondents
without

regard

proceeding.

to

their

consent

to

be

subjected

to

such

a

For, as the Division well knows, a ruling stemming

completely different way than ever before, without following any
rule making or legislative process to effect the change.
7

from

a

Declaratory

Order

proceeding

is

not

binding

on

any

interested party who does not consent to be bound by the ruling.
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-21(3)(b). The Division is attempting
to do by administrative fiat what it is, as a practical matter,
unable to do under the UAPA, to the substantial detriment and
prejudice of Merit and its employees.
There is no showing by the Division that any other party has
any

legal

interest

in the outcome of the challenges

to the

citations, or that intervention is necessary or desirable for the
resolution of the specific issue presented by the challenge to the
citations.

Because there is no basis or need for any third party

to intervene in this matter, there is no reason to convert the
matter from informal to formal.3
Under

the

intervention

provisions

relating

to

formal

adjudicative proceedings, only parties who can demonstrate that
they have

"legal rights or interests" in the matter may intervene

and be heard on the record in the proceeding.
§63-46b-9(l)(c).

Utah Code Annotated

Neither the Act, the UAPA nor the Division Rules

define what constitutes a legal right or interest for purposes of
determining the right of a third party to intervene in a formal
adjudicative proceeding.

However, the case law in Utah under Rule

24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is both instructive and
binding as to what showing is required before a party is entitled
to intervene.

For example, in Lima v. Chambers, 657 P. 2d 279,

3

Although the Division may want to avoid a de novo review by
the Utah State District Court as provided under the Division Rules
and the UAPA provisions governing informal proceedings.
8

(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court announced that "[t]o
justify

intervention,

demonstrate

a

direct

the

party

interest

in

seeking
the

intervention

subject

matter

must

of

the

litigation such that the intervener1s rights may be affected, for
good or for ill." (emphasis added)

More specifically, the Court

stated:
[The
required]
interest
does
not
include
a mere,
consequential, remote or conjectural possibility of being in
some manner affected by the result of the original action. It
must be such a direct claim upon the subject matter of the
action that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct
operation of the judgment to be rendered.
657 P.2d at

(quoting State v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343, 346

(Mo. Ct. App. 1963)(emphasis added).

Since the decision in Lima,

the Utah Court of Appeals has found that "the test normally applied
to the right

to intervene

is whether the person

seeking

to

intervene may gain or lose by a direct legal operation and the
effect of the Judgment." Interstate Land Corporation v. Patterson,
797 P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990)(citing Commercial Block Realty v.
USF&G, 28 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Utah 1934))(emphasis added).
No other party has any legal right or interest which will be
"directly affected" by a judgment in this matter.

For example, no

judgment to be rendered in this matter will create any entitlement
by members of any union to be employed on the project. No judgment
to be rendered in this matter will or can obligate Kennecott to
contract with members of any particular trade association.

Such

groups have no direct legal interest or right which will in any way
be directly enhanced or impaired by the outcome of this citation
contest.

The politically or ideologically driven beliefs of such
9

groups as to whether the refinery is "related to" Kennecott's metal
mining operation are irrelevant to the resolution of this matter.
No other party who would have any hope of proving a direct interest
in the outcome of this case has identified itself or expressed any
interest whatsoever in being involved.

No showing of a need to

provide a forum for qualified intervenors has been made by the
Division.

Therefore, a conversion to a formal proceeding is not

warranted

in

respondentsf
otherwise

this

case

and

will

materially

prejudice

the

rights to substantive and procedural due process

provided

for

under

the

rules

governing

informal

proceedings.
In the order, the presiding officer seems to attach major
significance to the fact that respondents have retained legal
counsel to represent them in this matter.

That fact is absolutely

irrelevant and inappropriate to any decision or consideration of
the conversion

of

this matter

adjudicative proceeding.

from an informal

to a

formal

Parties contesting citations under the

Act are certainly entitled to have legal counsel represent them and
cannot be prejudiced for having exercised their right to counsel.
The criteria for determining whether conversion is warranted do not
provide for consideration of whether any party has retained legal
counsel.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, respondents request that the matter
be remanded for informal proceedings consistent with the UAPA and
the Division Rules. Further, the respondents respectfully request
10

a hearing

of

the Division f s Motion and Order as well

as

this

Objection.
DATED this

-*

day of March, 1994.
WALST

Darrel J. feostwick
Jeffery R.^Price
Attorneys for Respondents
OF COUNSEL:
Armin J. Moeller, Jr.
PHELPS DUNBAR
Suite 500 - Security Centre North
200 South Lamar Street
P.O. Box 23066
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066
Telephone: (601) 352-2500
Fax: (601) 360-9777

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1, Darrel J. Bostwick, hereby certify that on this

-^ ^ ^

day

of March, 1994, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of
Object
Formal

to Motion

and Order Converting

Adjudicative

Supervisor,

Bureau

Proceeding
of

upon

Contest of Citations
William

Investigations, DOPL

S.

Essex,

Construction

to

Jr.,
Trades

Licensing Section by hand delivering same to his offices located at
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Heber M. Wells
Building, 160 East 300 South, Post Office Box 45805, Salt Lake
City,

Utah

84145-0805,

and

to
11

Betsy

L.

Ross,

Esquire,

Utah

Assistant Attorney General, by mailing the same to her office
located at State Office Building, #4120, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114.

Darrel J A Boistwick
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CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PREAMBLE
A.rticle

I.
H.
HI.
IV.
V.
VI.
VH.

[LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT]
[EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT]
[JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT]
[STATE AND TERRITORIAL RELATIONS]
[AMENDMENT]
[MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS]
[ADOPTION]

AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI

PREAMBLE
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.

ARTICLE I
[LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT]
Section
1. [Legislative powers vested in Congress.]
2. [House of Representatives.]
3. [Senate.]
4. [Election of members — Sessions.]
5. [Organization — Proceedings — Adjournment.]

Section
6. [Compensation — Privileges — Holding
other office.]
7. [Bills and resolutions — Veto.]
8. [Powers of Congress.]
9. [Powers denied Congress.]
10. [Powers denied the states.]

Section 1. [Legislative powers vested in Congress.]
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shal] consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Sec. 2. [House of Representatives.]
[1.] The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each
State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
[2.] No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the
Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States
5

AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of £he United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVHI.
XIX.
XX.
XXI.
XXII.
XXIII.
XXIV.

Declaration of Rights.
State Boundaries.
Ordinance.
Elections and Right of Suffrage.
Distribution of Powers.
Legislative Department.
Executive Department.
Judicial Department.
Congessional and Legislative Apportionment.
Education.
Counties, Cities and Towns.
Corporations.
Revenue and Taxation.
Public Debt.
Militia.
Labor.
Water Rights.
Forestry.
Public Buildings and State Institutions.
Public Lands.
Salaries.
Miscellaneous.
Amendment and Revision.
Schedule.

PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people of Utah, in
order to secure and perpetuate the principles of free government, do ordain
and establish this CONSTITUTION.
Cross-References. — Enabling Act permitting adoption of Constitution, Enabling Act,
§ 1 et seq.
^ O T E S TO DECISIONS
—Same word used repeatedly.
—-Substitution of one word for another.
Definition of Constitution.
Relation to state.

ANALYSIS

Construction.
—All language to be given effect.
—Applicability of maxims.
—Construction by legislature.
—In light of circumstances surrounding origin.
—Inclusion of Constitution in "law."
—Intent.
—Limitation of powers.
—Prospective operation.
—Provisos.

Construction.
—'All language to be given effect
When possible, effect should be given to all
of language used in constitutional provision.
Hailing v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 112,
263 P. 78 (1927).
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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
project did not unconstitutionally grant benefits to private individuals; any benefits were
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-

Art. I, § 24

mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975).

COLLATERAL

REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises
§§ 9 to 23.

C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26.
Key Numbers. — Franchises «=> 11.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec.
26.

History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-i-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Age of majority.
Agent for service of process.
Automobile license law.
Construction with Art. VI, § 26.
Contract carrier permit.
Cosmetologists' license law.
Criminal actions.
—Investigations.
—Prosecution.
—Sentence.
Criminal sentence.
Disparate tax assessments.
Excess revenue refunds.
Guest statutes.
Inheritance Tax Law.
Insurance premium tax exemption.
Intoxicating liquor.
Licenses.
Massage parlor ordinance.
Municipal employment prerequisites.
Notice requirements.
Property.
—Responsibility for water service.
Public employees' retirement system.
Public officers' bonds.
Public officers' salaries.
Road poll tax.
School activities.
Search warrants.
Sunday closing laws.
Tax sales.
Unfair Practices Act.
In general.
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever
uniform laws can be enacted. State v.
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R.
696 (1921).
Objects and purposes of law present touchstone for determining proper and improper

classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78
P.2d 920,117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. &
R E . Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766
(1941).
One who assails legislative classification as
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such.
State v. J.B. & RE. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so
long as there is some basis for differentiation
between classes or subject matters included, as
compared to those excluded, provided differentiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of
act. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Before legislative enactment can be interfered with, court must be able to say that there
is no fair reason for the law that would not
require equally its extension to those which it
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Only where some persons or transactions excluded from operation of law are, as to the subject matter of the law, in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation, is the law
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis
to differentiate can be found, law must be held
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Inability of legislature to make perfect classification does not render statute unconstitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100
Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
In determining whether classification made
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimination is very essence of classification and is not
objectionable unless founded upon unreasonable distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City,
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948).
An act is never unconstitutional because of
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63-46b-4

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is to award a license or
other privilege as to which there are multiple competing applicants, the
agency may, by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative proceeding to
determine the award of that license or privilege.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-3, enacted by
1987, ch. 161, § 259; 1988, ch. 72, § 16.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

i- ui i
Defect in notice
\yajver
Dismissal.
fr°m
.. h i i
A
ThereferenceWto "applicable law" in Subsection (3)(a) is a reference to an agency's enabling statute as adopted by the legislature,
not an agency's rules as adopted by the agency.
Nielson v. Division of Peace Officer Stds. &
Training, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
A

Defect in notice.
—Waiver.
Motorist's failure to object to the manner of

notice or type of hearing at the beginning of a
driver's license suspension hearing, when he
w a s c ear v
^ ^ informed that the proceeding
would be conducted informally, precluded him
complaining, on appeal, that the original
notice of hearing sent to him did not advise
hi
f whether the hearing was to be formal or
J ? * ™ ? - ? I n r l k e I h o f I v" Sdwendiman, 790
R 2 d 587
< U t a h C t - APP- 1990 >Dismissal
_.
", ...
. ,.
.,
,
Dismissals without prejudice are authorized
under Subsection (3)(d)(in). Doubletree, Inc. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 797 P.2d 464 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).

63-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative proceedings as informal — Standards — Undesignated proceedings formal.
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings to be conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules
enacted under the authority of this chapter if:
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate any procedural
requirement imposed by a statute other than this chapter;
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the parties to the proceedings will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures;
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will
be enhanced by categorizations; and
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings outweighs the potential
benefits to the public of a formal adjudicative proceeding.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's
rules shall be conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this
chapter.
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudicative proceeding,
the presiding officer may convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights
of any party.
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(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings,
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in Judicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990,
ch. 132, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendmerit, effective April 23,1990, added the exception at the end of Subsection (l)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Final agency action.
Function of district court.
Right to judicial proceeding.
Cited,
Final agency action.
Industrial Commission's determination of
wrongful discharge was not final, and so not
reviewable under this section, because the
commission and the parties had not resolved
the issue of reimbursement for lost wages and
benefits as required by § 34-28-19(2). Parkdale
Care Ctr. v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
Function of district court.
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,
the district court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-

ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert.
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily
delegated to the district court is to review informal agency adjudicative proceedings. State
v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App.
1990)
Right to judicial proceeding.
District court erred in declining a de novo
review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reciprocity, where there had been no proceeding on
his application that was sufficiently judicial in
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing
agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hearing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct.
^pp. 1991).
Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d
233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Ct.
App. 1993).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(£) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-

ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Agency action.
Applicability of section.
Arbitrary action.
Conflicting evidence.
Factual
findings.
Final order.
Function of district court
Jurisdictional hearing by board.
Prior practice.
Q?V1T'I
<•
Standard of review.
—Interpretation of statutory term.
—Questions of law.
Substantial evidence test.
Substantial prejudice.
Whole record test.
^lted*
Agency action.
Whether the Industrial Commission acted
contrary to its own rule is governed by Subsection (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. Indus-

trial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
Applicability of section.
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of
deference an appellate court grants to an
agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief
granted w n e n , although the
should not ^
a g e n c y c o m m i t t e d error> t h e e r r o r w a s h a r m .
legs

Morton

lnt%

Inc

y

Utah

gtate

Tax

Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Arbitrary action.
Industrial commission's denial of occupat i o n a i disease disability benefits based upon a
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of
causation failed to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and therefore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v.
Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

310

R156-46b-202. Informal Adjudicative Proceedings.
(1) The following adjudicative proceedings initiated by a
request for agency action are classified as informal adjudicative
proceedings:
(a) approval or denial of application to take a licensure
examination;
(b) disqualification of examination results for cheating on
examination;
(c) request for rescoring of examination;
(d) approval of application for initial licensure, renewal or
reinstatement of licensure, or relicensure;
(e) denial of application for initial licensure or
relicensure;
(f) denial of application for reinstatement of licensure
submitted pursuant to Subsection 58-1-308(6) (a);
(g) denial of application for reinstatement of restricted,
suspended, or probationary licensure during the term of the
restriction, suspension, or probation;
(h) determination of monetary limit under Section 58-55-21, in
conjunction with approval of application for initial licensure or
relicensure, or in conjunction with an application for increased
monetary limit;
(i) approval or denial of application for inactive or emeritus
licensure status;
(J) approval or denial of request to surrender licensure;
(k) approval or denial of request for entry into diversion
program under Section 58-1-404;
(1) matters relating to diversion program;
(m) contested citation hearing held in accordance with Subsection 58-55-13 (4) ;
(n) board of appeal held in accordance with Subsection
58-56-8(3);
(o) approval or denial of request for modification of disciplinary order;
(p) informal advice determining the applicability of statute,
rule or order to specified circumstances;
(q) declaratory order determining the applicability of statute, rule or order to specified circumstances, when determined by
the director to be conducted as an informal adjudicative proceeding;
(r) approval or denial of request for correction of procedural
or clerical mistakes;
(s) approval or denial of request for correction of other than
procedural or clerical mistakes; and
(t) all other requests for agency action not specifically
classified as formal adjudicative proceedings in Subsection
R156-46b-201(l) .
(2) A disciplinary proceeding initiated by a Notice of Agency
Action issued pursuant to a Petition seeking exclusively the
issuance of a private reprimand is classified as an informal
adjudicative proceeding.

(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of
The Mead Corp.

109622

R156-46b-403. Evidentiary Hearings in Informal Adjudicative
Proceedings.
(1) Evidentiary hearings are not required for informal division adjudicative proceedings unless required by statute or rule,
or permitted by rule and requested by a party within the time
prescribed by rule.
(2) Unless otherwise provided, a request for an evidentiary
hearing permitted by rule must be submitted in writing no later
than 20 days following the issuance of the notice of agency
action if the proceeding was initiated by the division, or
together with the request for agency action if the proceeding was
not initiated by the division.
(3) Evidentiary hearings are required for the following
informal proceedings:
(a) R156-46b-202(1) (m) , contested citation hearing held in
accordance with Subsection 58-55-13(4); and
(b) R156-46b-202(1)(n), board of appeal held in accordance
with Subsection 58-56-8(3).
(4) Evidentiary hearings are permitted for the following
informal proceedings:
(a) R156-46b-202(1)(b), disqualification of examination
results for cheating upon an examination;
(b) R156-46b-202(1)(1), matters relating to a diversion
program; and
(c) R156-46b-202(2)(a)(i), issuance of a private reprimand.
(5) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, no evidentiary
hearing shall be held in an informal adjudicative proceeding
unless timely notice of the hearing has been served upon the
parties as required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(d). Timely notice
means service of a Notice of Hearing upon all parties not later
than ten days prior to any scheduled evidentiary hearing.
(6) Parties shall be permitted to testify, present evidence,
and comment on the issues at an evidentiary hearing in a division
informal adjudicative proceeding.

(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of
The Mead Corp,

109622
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R156-46b-202. Informal Adjudicative Proceedings.
(1)
The following adjudicative proceedings initiated by a
request for agency action are classified as informal adjudicative
proceedings:
(a)
approval or denial of application to take a licensure
examination;
(b)
disqualification of examination results for cheating on
examination;
(c) request for rescoring of examination;
(d) approval of application for initial licensure, renewal or
reinstatement of licensure, or relicensure;
(e) denial of application for initial licensure or relicensure;
(f)
denial of application for reinstatement of licensure
submitted pursuant to Subsection 58-1-308(6) (a);
(g)
denial of application for reinstatement of restricted,
suspended, or probationary licensure during the term of the
restriction, suspension, or probation;
(h) determination of monetary limit under Section 58-55-21, in
conjunction with approval of application for initial licensure or
relicensure, or in conjunction with an application for increased
monetary limit;
(i) approval or denial of application for inactive or emeritus
licensure status;
(j)
approval or denial of claims against the Residence Lien
Recovery Fund created under Title 38, Chapter 11, except those in
which the claimant is precluded from obtaining the required civil
judgment or administrative order against the original contractor
involved in the claim because the original contractor filed
bankruptcy;
(k) approval or denial of request to surrender licensure;
(1)
approval or denial of request for entry into diversion
program under Section 58-1-404;
(m) matters relating to diversion program;
(n) contested citation hearing held in accordance with Subsection 58-55-13 (4) ;
(o)
board of appeal held in accordance with Subsection
58-56-8(3);
(p) approval or denial of request for modification of disciplinary order;
(q)
informal advice determining the applicability of statute,
rule or order to specified circumstances;
(r) declaratory order determining the applicability of statute,
rule or order to specified circumstances, when determined by the
director to be conducted as an informal adjudicative proceeding;
(s) approval or denial of request for correction of procedural
or clerical mistakes;
(t) approval or denial of request for correction of other than
procedural or clerical mistakes; and
(u)
all other requests for agency action not specifically
classified as formal adjudicative proceedings in Subsection
R156-46b-201(l).
(2) A disciplinary proceeding initiated by a Notice of Agency
Action issued pursuant to a Petition seeking exclusively the

issuance of a private reprimand is classified as an informal
adjudicative proceeding.

(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The
Mead Corp.

R156-46b-403.
Proceedings.

Evidentiary

Hearings

in

Informal

Adjudicative

(1) Evidentiary hearings are not required for informal division
adjudicative proceedings unless required by statute or rule, or
permitted by rule and requested by a party within the time
prescribed by rule.
(2)
Unless otherwise provided, a request for an evidentiary
hearing permitted by rule must be submitted in writing no later
than 20 days following the issuance of the notice of agency action
if the proceeding was initiated by the division, or together with
the request for agency action if the proceeding was not initiated
by the division.
(3) Evidentiary hearings are required for the following informal
proceedings:
(a)
R156-46b-202(1) (n), contested citation hearing held in
accordance with Subsection 58-55-13(4); and
(b) R156-46b-202 (1) (o) , board of appeal held in accordance with
Subsection 58-56-8(3).
(4)
Evidentiary hearings are permitted for the following
informal proceedings:
(a) R156-46b-202(1)(b), disqualification of examination results
for cheating upon an examination;
(b) R156-46b-202 (1) (m) , matters relating to a diversion program;
and
(c) R156-46b-202(2), issuance of a private reprimand.
(5)
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, no evidentiary
hearing shall be held in an informal adjudicative proceeding unless
timely notice of the hearing has been served upon the parties as
required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(d). Timely notice means service
of a Notice of Hearing upon all parties not later than ten days
prior to any scheduled evidentiary hearing.
(6) Parties shall be permitted to testify, present evidence, and
comment on the issues at an evidentiary hearing in a division
informal adjudicative proceeding.

(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The
Mead Corp.
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805
Telephone:
(801) 530-6628
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MOTION TO CONVERT TO
FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDINGS

IN THE MATTER OF THE
CITATIONS ISSUED TO
MERIT Electrical &
Instrumentation, Inc.
Jonathan Carl Juretich
Christopher M. Schiffman
Dan A. Johnson
Kit Vaness Carson

CITATION NOS. 1986
1841
1917
1918
1842

COMES NOW the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
("Division") by and through William

S. Essex, Jr., Supervisor,

Bureau of Investigations, Construction Trades Licensing Section,
and requests pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
("U.C.A."),

§

63-46b-4(3),

that

the

(1990 Replacement)

adjudicative

proceeding

initiated by the issuance of Citation Nos. 1986, 1841, 1917, 1918,
and 1842 to MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., Jonathan Carl
Juretich, Christopher M. Schiffman, Dan A. Johnson, and Kit Vaness
Carson be converted to a formal adjudicative proceeding.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Citation No. 1986, 1841, 1917, 1918, and 1942 was issued to
MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., Jonathan Carl Juretich,
Christopher M. Schiffman, Dan A. Johnson, and Kit Vaness Carson on

December 9, 1993. James W. Grant B. Antone Robinson, and Wayne J,
Holman, Division Investigator, issued the citation pursuant to the
authority granted in § 58-55-6((6). The citation was issued for an
alleged violation of § 58-55-2(32)(a), U.C.A.

Section 58-55-2(32)(a), U.C.A. provides that it is unlawful
for any person to Engaged in or represented himself to be engaged
in a construction trade or acted as or represented himself to be
acting as a contractor in a construction trade requiring licensure
while not licensed or excepted from licensure.
MERIT

Electrical

&

Instrumentation,

Inc., Jonathan

Carl

Juretich, Christopher M. Schiffman, Dan A. Johnson, and Kit Vaness
Carson

("Respondents") submitted

a Notice of Response to the

Division on December 27, 1994 in which he denied committing the
offense described

in the citation and requested a hearing to

contest the citation.
"Respondents"

base their denial of the charge on Section 58-

55-6(2) U.C.A., 1990 exempts from licensure"...any person engaged
in...construction and repair relating to...metal and coal mining.
Ruling

on

this

point

of

law

requires

the

expertise

of

the

Administrative Law Judge and the Contractors Licensing Board.

STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY
Subsection 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A., permits agencies to designate
categories of adjudicative proceedings by rule.

Rule 156-46b-4,

Utah Administrative Rules (1992), designates any hearing held in
conjunction with a citation issued under Chapter 55, Title 58,
Construction Trades Licensing Act as an informal

adjudicative

proceeding.
Subsection 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A. provides that any time before
a

final

order

is

issued

in

an

adjudicative

proceeding,

the

presiding officer may convert an informal adjudicative proceeding
to a formal adjudicative proceeding if:
(a) conversion
interest; and

of the

proceeding

(b) conversion of the proceeding
prejudice the rights of any party.
Subsection

63-46b-5(l)(c)

provides

is

in the

does not
that

in

public

unfairly
informal

adjudicative proceedings, the parties are entitled to "testify,
present evidence, and comment on the issues."
Subsection 63-46b-8(l)(d) provides that in formal adjudicative
proceedings, the parties are entitled to "present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examine, and submit rebuttal evidence.
ARGUMENT
Respondents challenge the Division's issuance of the citations
relevant

to this processing

and urge

58-55-6(2) U.C.A.,

1990

applies to exempt them from licensure that statute provides and
exception for "...any person engaged in...construction and repair
relating to...metal and coal mining."

Any ruling on this legal

argument requires the expertise of both the Administrative Law
Judge, Contractors Licensinq Board and Electricians Board.

It is further anticipated that both sides will call a number
of witnesses and require the need to follow the formal process of
direct and cross examination. A formal proceedings will also allow
the intervention and presentation of evidence by other interested
parties,
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY
Subsection 63-46b04(l), U.C.A., permits agencies to designate
categories of adjudicative proceedings by ruleConversion

of

the

proceedings

to

a

Rule 156-46b-4.

formal

adjudicative

proceeding is therefore permitted by Section 63-46b-4(3) and is
appropriate given the circumstances present in this case.
Wherefore the Division requests that its motion be granted
unless the Respondent files an objection to the motion within 20
days from the date of this motion and the objection shows good
cause why the motion should not be granted.
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING

DATE: /*£/*«**€<-

//, /4 9fy

BY: /ft^ff,^—^^/!
William S. Essex, Jr., Supervisor
Bureau of Investigations
Construction Trades Licensing Section
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805
Telephone : (801) 530-6628

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
CITATION ISSUED TO
Merit Electrical &
Instrumentation, Inc.,
Jonathan Carl Juretich,
Christopher M. Schiffman,
Dan A. Johnson, and
Kit Vaness Carson
(Respondent)

ORDER CONVERTING CITATION
TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
CITATION NOS.
1846
1841
1917
1918
1842

The Division in the above matter and prior to a hearing being
conducted has by motion requested this matter be converted to
formal adjudicative proceedings pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3) of
the Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
The basis given for the motion is that the content and scope
of the presentation anticipated in this case exceed the parameters
considered

when

citations

hearings

were

set

as

informal

adjudicative proceedings and therefore the public interest, rights
of the parties, issues and testimony involved in this case can be
better protected and addressed in a formal adjudicative proceeding
and that no party is prejudiced by the conversion.
It is noted from the files on these matters an attorney has
already made appearances in each of these matters and it appears

the parties expect the proceedings to go beyond the limitations
imposed by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(c).

It also appears that no

party will be prejudiced by conversion to a formal proceedings as
no hearing or other proceedings has yet been held in this matter.
ORDER
Having found that conversion of this proceeding is in the
public interest and does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any
party and unless Respondents, within 20 days of the date of this
order, files a written objection to the motion to convert to formal
adjudicative
converted

proceedings,

from

informal

adjudicative proceedings.

it

is ordered

adjudicative

that

this

proceedings

matter
to

is

formal

This matter shall be rescheduled for

hearing before the Contractors Licensing Board.
The Respondents shall have 20 days from the date of this order
to file a written objection to this order.

If the Respondents so

object this order shall be vacated and a new order will thereafter
be issued determining whether or not conversion is appropriate in
this case.
Dated this fr ^

day of February 1994.

^^-^<r^fe^^—^

Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the
day of February, 1994, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER CONVERTING CITATIONS
ISSUED TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS was sent first class
mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc.
Attn: Dave Roberts
Richard Cloy
17723 Airline Highway
Prairieville, Louisiana 70769
MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
Attn: Clint Cloy
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
Armin J. Moeller, Jr., Esquire
Phelps Dunbar
P O Box 23066
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066
Christopher M. Schiffman
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
Jonathan Carl Juretich
1081 East Saphire Drive
Sandy, Utah 84094
Dan A, Johnson
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
James C. Cloy
6500 South James Point Drive #3x
Murray, Utah 84107
Kit Vaness Carson
3 53 South 1st West
Tooele, Utah 84074

Darrell Bostwick
254 West 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Carol W. Inglesby
Administrative Assistant

Carol Inglesby, Administrative Assistant
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805
Telephone : (801) 530-6628

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
CITATION ISSUED TO
Merit Electrical &
Instrumentation, Inc.,
Jonathan Carl Juretich,
Christopher M. Schiffman,
Dan A. Johnson, and
Kit Vaness Carson
(Respondent)

ORDER VACATING CONVERSION OF
CITATIONS TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDINGS AND NOTICE OF HEARING
CITATION NOS.
1846
1841
1917
1918
1842

The Division in the above matter and prior to a hearing being
conducted by motion requested this matter be converted to formal
adjudicative proceedings pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3) of the
Utah Code Annotated

(1953), as amended.

Pursuant to the Division's motion an order was signed granting
the motion to convert proceeding on February 11, 1994.

That order

provided that if the Respondents filed a written objection to the
motion to convert to formal adjudicative proceedings, the order
would

be

vacated

and

a

new

order

will

thereafter

be

issued

determining whether or not conversion is appropriate in this case.
On

the

3rd

day

of

March

1994,

the

Respondents

filed

an

on

the

objection to the motion to convert.
The

Respondent's

have

also

requested

a

hearing

Division's

Motion

to

Convert

and

the

Respondent's

Objection

thereto,
ORDER
Having

found

that

the

Respondents

have

filed

a written

objection to the motion to convert these proceedings to formal
adjudicative proceedings as allowed by the prior order, it is
ordered that the order of conversion of proceedings dated February
11, 1994 is hereby vacated.
This matter is hereby rescheduled for hearing on the Division
Motion to Convert Proceedings and Respondents Objection thereto to
be conducted on March 28, 1994 at 2:00 p.m. in Room 451 of the
Heber Wells Building 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Dated this

day of March 1994.

Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the
day of March, 1994, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER VACATING CONVERSION OF
CITATIONS TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND NOTICE OF HEARING
was sent first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc.
Attn: Dave Roberts
Richard Cloy
17723 Airline Highway
Prairieville, Louisiana 70769
MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
Attn: Clint Cloy
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
Armin J. Moeller, Jr., Esquire
Phelps Dunbar
P O Box 23066
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066
Christopher M. Schiffman
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
Jonathan Carl Juretich
1081 East Saphire Drive
Sandy, Utah 84094
Dan A. Johnson
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
James C. Cloy
6500 South James Point Drive #3x
Murray, Utah 84107
Kit Vaness Carson
353 South 1st West
Tooele, Utah 84074

Darrell Bostwick
254 West 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Carol W. Inglesby
Administrative Assistant

Carol Inglesby, Administrative Assistant
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805
Telephone : (801) 530-6628

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
CITATION ISSUED TO
Merit Electrical &
Instrumentation, Inc.,
Jonathan Carl Juretich,
Christopher M. Schiffman,
Dan A. Johnson, and
Kit Vaness Carson
(Respondent)

ORDER CONVERTING CITATION
TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
CITATION NOS.
1846
1841
1917
1918
1842

The above matters came on for hearing on the Division's motion
to convert the above citation to formal adjudicative proceedings on
March 28, 1994.

The Presiding Officer being fully advised in the

premises now enters the following Conclusions of Law and Order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Jurisdiction.
The Respondents in their objection to Motion and Order have
alleged that upon entry of the order converting these matters to
formal adjudicative proceedings entered on February 11, 1994, the
presiding officer divested himself of any further jurisdiction in
the matter until the ALJ remanded the matter
hearing.
1

as an informal

This argument is without merit.
clearly

retained

jurisdiction

The February 11, 1994 order

if the

order was

objected

to.

Specifically, the applicable portion of the order reads as follows:
The Respondents shall have 20 days from the date of this
order to file a written objection to this order.
If the
Respondents so object this order shall be vacated and a new
order will thereafter be issued determining whether or not
conversion is appropriate in this case.
Must Citation be heard as informal hearings.
The Respondents claim that Utah Administrative Code Section
R156-46b-4(2)(d) requires that citation hearings shall be conducted
on an informal basis, and therefore the Division is violating its
own

rules

in

its

motion

to

convert

the

matter

to

formal

adjudicative proceedings.
This argument is without merit.

The Division in designating

citation hearings as informal adjudicative proceedings, did not
eliminate the possibility that appropriate cases could be converted
to formal adjudicative proceedings.
that

the

Divisions

Bureau

of

To the contrary it is noted

Investigations,

Policies

and

Procedures manual dated December 1, 1993 anticipated that such
conversions to formal proceedings would occur in appropriate cases
and included model forms drafted for the purposes of conversion of
such cases to formal proceedings.

It therefore appears this

possibility of converting matters to formal proceedings was a
factor in designating citations as informal procedures.
Furthermore the Utah Administrative Procedures Act at Utah
Code Annotated

§ 63-46b-4(3) clearly provides, "any11

proceeding may be converted to formal proceedings.
2

informal

Criteria for Conversion.
Having found that there is no prohibition against converting
to formal proceedings and having found no specific Division rules
on

the

criteria

for

conversion

of

such

matters

to

formal

adjudicative proceedings, the applicable requirements to support an
order

of

conversion

to

formal

procedures

is

found

at

Utah

Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-4(3)
which requires that the conversion of the proceedings is in the
public interest and conversion of the proceedings does not unfairly
prejudice any party.
Public Interest.
The Division has cited the public interest in conversion of
this case in that the proceeding

to be conducted

are highly

disputed in what may be a novel interpretation of the facts and law
which may require the cross examination of witnesses and require
submittal of rebuttal evidence in order fully address the issues in
the

case, and may

require

the

expertise

of

the

contractors

licensing board.
I find the public interest has been sufficiently shown in
these cases.
Subsection

63-46b-5(l)(c)

provides

that

in

informal

adjudicative proceedings, the parties are entitled to "testify,
present evidence, and comment on the issues".
This is compared to subsection 63-46b-8(1)(d) which provides
that in formal adjudicative proceedings, the parties are entitled
to "present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination and
3

submit rebuttal evidence".
In most citation hearings, the limited scope of the hearing is
sufficient

to adequately

address

all

issues

that need

to be

presented to fully advise the presiding officer of the premises in
the case.
The wider scope of the formal proceeding is designed to assure
the parties are given full and fair opportunity to present and
argue their respective cases. This full opportunity to present the
respective case in a formal proceeding appears to be the very
reason that a trial de novo is allowed in an appeal to district
court if the parties have only been accorded an informal hearing
and not allowed if the parties have had a formal hearing. (To be
addressed more later).
The Respondents have argued that the sole issue in this case
is a matter of law and therefore there are no factual issues and
therefore cross examination is not needed and therefore an informal
hearing can resolve the matter.
This argument is without merit.
The parties are disputing whether the work that was the basis
for the citation is included in the exemption allowed under Utah
Code Annotated section 58-55-6-(2) for construction and operation
incidental to metal or coal mining.

The parties dispute whether

the construction of a refinery operation is sufficiently related to
"mining" to allow the exemption in these cases.
Black's law dictionary defines mining as, "The process or
business of extracting from the earth the precious or valuable
4

metals, either in their native state or in their ores."
It would appear from the plain language of the exemption may
not include refining ore which would not be done at the mine site
itself where the "extracting from the earth" occurs• The extent of
how far the language "incidental to" goes is a mixed question of
law and fact.
It is inconceivable, as a presiding officer, that I can decide
this issue without receiving factual testimony of what is the
relationship of the mine site to the refinery site.
apparent

to me

that

in order

to have

this

It is equally

issue

adequately

addressed that any such testimony of how closely related these
activities are should be subject to cross examination by the other
parties in order to fully evaluate this case.
Therefore I find that conversion to formal proceedings is
necessary to the proper resolution of the matter.

It would be a

needless waste of the resources of both parties to force the
parties to conduct an informal hearing when a formal hearing is
necessary to fully resolve the issues. It appears that forcing the
parties to participate in an informal hearing in such a case, no
matter which party prevailed, would only force an appeal so that
the parties could fully present their case in a formal setting. It
is in the public interest for appropriate cases to be resolved with
full presentation

of the case to avoid

unnecessary

waste of

resources and to have the matter adequately addressed at the first
hearing of the matter.

5

No unfair prejudice to any party.
The Respondents have alleged that they will be denied their
right to trial de novo at district court if the matter is converted
to an formal proceedings and is therefore prejudicial and therefore
conversion is not allowed.
This argument is without merit.
The import of the trial de novo is that a party at some stage
must be given the full opportunity to present its case with all the
appropriate protections and rights accorded a formal hearing.
The fact that conversion to formal proceedings may change the
rights on appeal at district court is not dispositive.

If it were,

any conversion to formal proceedings would be impossible.

Since

conversion is clearly allowed, this right to trial de novo cannot
be the deciding factor of whether or not to order the conversion.
The only prejudicial effect that I can find presented by these
matters, of whether an a order should be issued converting the
matters to formal proceedings, is that the parties right to fully
present the case in these matters may prejudiced in an informal
setting because of the limitation of the informal hearing and
therefore find that these matters must be converted in to formal
proceedings in order to adequately address the issue at hand.
It is difficult to find a situation where being accorded the
full scope of a hearing to the parties in a formal proceeding could
be prejudicial to the presentation of their case.
It is noted that the motion for conversion was made prior to
any hearing on these citations.
6

The Respondents have not been

prejudiced by preparing for hearing in one setting and then being
required to hear the matter in another setting.
The Respondent have claimed that defending the actions in a
formal hearing will cost them more in defense costs and time and
therefore

is prejudicial to them and therefore should not be

converted. Again if this were the deciding criteria no cases could
be converted to formal proceedings, in that the formal proceedings
by

nature

of

the

allowed

presentation

will

take

more

time.

Therefore, this factor alone is not "unfairly" prejudicial to the
party.
Finally, the Respondents have claimed

that there may be

improper motives behind these citations or other improper actions
may happen in a formal proceeding preceding that should not be
allowed to happen.
I can find no merit to this argument.

Quite to the contrary,

if improprieties are at issue in this case it would only further
heighten the need that these matters be held in a setting which can
adequately address and rule upon such allegations.

I can find no

basis whatsoever to conclude that any motions or proceedings that
would be conducted on a formal basis would not be handled according
to applicable law.
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BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
MERIT ELECTRICAL AND
INSTRUMENTATION INC.
JONATHAN CARL JURETICH
CHRISTOPHER M. SCHIFFMAN
DAN A. JOHNSON AND
KIT VANESS CARSON

:

ORDER ON REVIEW

CITATION NOS.
OPL-94-28, OPL-94-29,
OPL-94-30, OPL-94-31
and OPL-94-32

INTRODUCTION
This case began with issuance of the above-enumerated citations by the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing ("DOPL") of the Department of Commerce.
Respondents requested a hearing to contest the citations. Pursuant to Department Rule 156-46b202(m), hearings in citation cases are designated as informal under the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act. However, on motion of DOPL, the hearing officer converted the proceedings
to formal (the "Conversion Order"), and it is that conversion that Respondents contest.
Respondents filed a request for review with the Executive Director of the Department, requesting
that the Conversion Order be reversed and that the Division enter an order setting an informal
hearing.

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
The review of this matter is being conducted by the Executive Director of the Department
of Commerce pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-13 of the Rules
of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce.

THE ISSUES REVIEWED
1.

Respondents raise the following issues:

a.

The Division has no authority to convert proceedings from informal to formal;

b.

Even if it does, conversion here is improper under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-4(3)
because conversion is not in the public interest and will cause unfair prejudice to
Respondents; and

c.

The Conversion Order is an impermissible attempt at rulemaking.

2.

Initially, however, the issue to be addressed is whether the Conversion Order is

reviewable by the Executive Director.

FINDINGS OF FACT
No evidence has yet been presented to establish any of the factual allegations relevant to
the citation in this proceeding. However, the procedural history of this case can be summarized
as follows:
1.

On or about December 9, 1993, DOPL issued citations to Merit Electrical &

Instrumentation, Inc. ("Merit") and four of its employees alleging violations of the Utah
Construction Trades Licensing Act (Utah Code Ann. Title 58, Chapter 55). The citations are

-2-

based on allegations that Merit unlawfully employed electricians who were unlicensed and not
exempt from licensure under the Act.
2.

The citations were consolidated into one proceeding. Pursuant to a request by

DOPL, and following briefing by the parties, the hearing officer issued the Conversion Order
dated April 5, 1994. Respondents filed a Request for Reconsideration. They also filed a Request
for Review with the executive director. Both parties have thoroughly briefed the issue in various
memoranda in support.

The hearing, previously scheduled to be conducted before the

Contractors' Licensing Board, has been continued without date pending completion of this
review.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Section 63-46b-14(l) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann.

Title 63, Chapter 46b ("UAPA") allows a party to seek judicial review of "final agency action".
The finality requirement applies to agency action taken in either informal or formal proceedings.
2.

UAPA is silent, however as to whether interim orders entered in proceedings

before a division are subject to agency review by the head of the department. Clearly, an order
is not "final" - for purposes of judicial review — if it reserves something to the agency for
further decision. See Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P. 2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
3.

The Utah Court of Appeals issued an unpublished opinion in Eliason v. Buhler,

et al (Case No. 900518, December 5, 1990) (copy attached). In that case, the executive director
of the Department of Commerce had issued an order on review prior to the conclusion of an
administrative proceeding. However, the court stated that:

-3-

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 (1989) permits further administrative review of an
administrative law judge's order only "|j|f a statute or the agency's rules permit
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek [such] review."
The Court ordered the executive director of the Department of Commerce to vacate an
order on review because he had no authority to review an interim order.
The statute on which the Court relied in the Eliason case, §13-1-12, has since been
repealed. That statute had permitted an appeal to the executive director "at the close of an
adjudicative proceeding". Section 13-1-8.5 generally applies to all departmental adjudicative
proceedings and thus requires the department to follow the UAPA. Section 63-46b-12 of the
UAPA provides that a party may file a request for review if permitted to do so by any statute or
rule. No statute exists which authorizes agency review of interim orders. Further, departmental
rules which govern agency review are silent as to whether any such review is permitted.
5.

Section 58-1-109, addressing administrative proceedings before DOPL, expressly

provides:
The final order of the director [or his designee] may be appealed by filing
a request for agency review with the executive director or his designee within the
department.
(§58-l-109(8))(Emphasis added)

Section §58-1-109 limits agency review to final orders. The Conversion Order is not a
final order. Thus, no proper legal basis exists to conduct agency review of that order during the
pendency of proceedings before the Division.
7.

Because of this ruling, I am not considering the issues raised by Respondents.

-4-

ORDER
Respondents' request for review of the Conversion Order is denied and this case is
remanded to the Division for further proceedings.
Dated thisc^/dav of June, 1994

CfottJkcn^Constance B. White, Executive Director
Department of Commerce

NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of this Order, if it is available, may be sought by filing a Petition for
Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition for such Review
shall comply with the requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16.

-5-
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ORIENTATION AND REFERENCE MANUAL
for
PROFESSIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING BOARD MEMBERS
Introduction
The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing is an
agency within the Department of Commerce and is charged with
licensing and regulating persons engaged in specific occupations
and professions designated by the legislature.
There is established for most of the regulated occupations and
professions, a Board or Committee to act, advise and otherwise
assist the Division in regulation of the specific occupation or
profession.
This Orientation and Reference Manual has been prepared to assist
new Board members to come to an understanding of their role as a
Board member, of the role of the Board, of the role of the
Division, of the method by which licensure is approved or denied,
and of the manner by which disciplinary action is taken against
the license of a person who acts unlawfully or unprofessionally.
Organization
The Department of Commerce is managed by an Executive Director
who is appointed by the Governor, and who serves as a member of
the Governor's cabinet.
Within the Department are the Divisions of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, Public Utilities, Corporations,
Securities, Real Estate, Consumer Protection, and the Committee
of Consumer Services.
The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, with
which Board members will now have a close association, is managed
by a Director who is appointed by the Executive Director with the
approval of the Governor.
The Division has within it the following major "working groups"
into which fall its various duties and responsibilities:
1. Bureaus of Health Professions Licensing I and II;
2. Bureau of Occupations and Professions Licensing;
3. Bureau of Construction Trades Licensing;
4. Bureau of Financial Audit
5. Bureau of Investigations;
6. Medical Malpractice Prelitigation Section; and
7. Administration.
Action of the Legislature has caused over forty (40) occupations or
1
6

professions
including
over
sixty
(60)
primary
license
classifications to be under the responsibility of the Division
The Division is assisted in the licensing and regulation of persons
in these specific classifications by over forty (40) Boards. Each
Board is assigned by the Division Director to a Bureau Manager for
the purposes of administration.
Board Appointments
Members of the Boards are appointed by the Executive Director of
the Department of Commerce after their selection has been confirmed
by the Governor.
Appointments are made from nominations made by associations or
groups representing regulated classifications, by individuals who
have an interest in regulation of the classification, by the Boards
themselves, or from other credible and responsible sources.
Boards are generally made up of five (5) members of whom four (4)
are persons licensed in the regulated classification, and one (1)
is a lay member from the public. There are a few boards which have
greater numbers such as the Board of nursing which is made up of
thirteen (13) numbers, and the Physicians Licensing Board which is
made up of seven (7) members. In all cases there is at least one
member who is a lay member from the public.
Appointments are generally for a term of five (5) years. There are
some "interim" appointments necessary when a Board member is not
able to continue service and a replacement must be named. In those
cases, the appointment will be for the remaining unexpired portion
of the original appointee's term.
A Board member may serve two consecutive terms; but, may not serve
more than two consecutive terms. A member who has once served two
consecutive terms may be reconsidered for appointment again after
an absence from board service for a minimum of two years.
Duties and Responsibilities of the Board
The Board is a vital part of the process of licensure and
regulation. Contained within the Board are those who have the
vital and necessary knowledge to make informed decisions particular
to a specific occupation or profession. The public member of the
Board has the unique responsibility to be the most pronounced voice
in the public interest. The Division cannot function effectively
in the public interest without the advice and counsel of its
Boards.
The statute has generally defined the duties, functions and
2
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responsibilities of the Boards under the "Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing Act". This is found in Chapter 1 of
Title 58, Utah Code Annotated, and is commonly referred to by the
Division and the Boards as the "umbrella chapter".
The Board
duties are primarily contained in Section 8 of Chapter 1, as
follows:
58-1-202. Boards - Duties, functions, and
responsibilities•
The duties, functions and responsibilities of each
board include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

recommending to the director appropriate rules;
recommending to the director policy and budgetary
matters;
approving and establishing a passing score for
applicant examinations;
screening applicants and recommending licensing
renewals reinstatement, and relicensure actions
to the director in writing;
assisting the director in establishing standards
of supervision for students or persons in
training to become qualified to obtain a license
in the occupation or profession it represents;
and
acting as presiding officer in conducting
hearings associated with adjudicative proceedings
and in issuing recommended orders when so
designated by the director.

There is set forth in another section, certain duties and
responsibilities of the Division which are to be carried out in
collaboration with the Board. They are contained in Section 9 of
Chapter 1, as follows:
58-1*203.
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Duties, functions, and responsibilities of
division in collaboration with board.
defining which schools, colleges, universities,
departments of universities, or other
institutions of learning are reputable and in
good standing;
prescribing license qualifications;
prescribing rules governing applications for
licenses;
providing for a fair and impartial method of
examination of applicants;
defining unprofessional conduct, by rule, to
supplement the definitions under this chapter or
other licensing chapters;
establishing advisory peer committees to the

8

(7)

board and prescribing their scope of authority;
and
establishing conditions for reinstatement and
renewal of licenses.

Please note, this statute assigns these duties and responsibilities
to the Division; but, directs that the Division shall collaborate
with the Board in making its decision and in taking action.
Duties and Responsibilities of the Division - Contrast With Duties
and Responsibilities of the Board
The duties and responsibilities specifically assigned to the
Division as they are set forth in Chapter 1 of Title 58, the
"umbrella chapter" are as follows:
58-1-106.

Division - Duties, functions, and
responsibilities•

The duties, functions and responsibilities of the
division include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

prescribing, adopting, and enforcing rules
to administer this title;
investigating the activities of any person
governed by the laws and rules administered and
enforced by the division;
subpoenaing witnesses, taking evidence and
requiring by subpoena duces tecum the production
of any books, papers, documents, records,
contracts, recordings, tapes, correspondence, or
information relevant to an investigation upon a
finding of sufficient need by the director;
taking administrative and judicial action
against persons in violation of the laws and
rules administered and enforced by the division,
including, but not limited to, the issuance of
cease and desist orders;
seeking injunctions and temporary restraining
orders to restrain unauthorized activity;
giving public notice of board meetings;
keeping records of board meetings, proceedings,
and actions and making those records available
for public inspection upon request;
issuing, refusing to issue, revoking,
suspending, renewing, refusing to renew, or
otherwise acting upon any license or licensee;
preparing and submitting to the governor and the
Legislature an annual report of the divisions
operations, activities, and goals;
preparing and submitting to the executive
director of the department a budget of the

9

(11)
(12)

expenses for the division;
establishing the time and place for the
administration of examinations; and
preparing lists of licensees and making these
lists available to the public at cost upon
request unless otherwise prohibited by state or
federal law.

A comparison of the duties and responsibilities of the Division and
the duties and responsibilities of the Board generally establishes
the Board in an advisory, recommending, and assisting role
supporting the Division in taking appropriate action. Development
of a positive relationship in the public interest between the
Division and Boards requires an understanding of the respective
roles assigned by the Legislature, and respect for the integrity
and intent of each body by the other.
Board Meetings
Board meetings for many Boards are held once each month. For some
Boards who do not have an influx of new applicants for licensure or
other necessary business, the meetings may be held on a quarterly
basis, and rarely on a semi-annual or annual basis.
Monthly meetings are usually scheduled on the same day of each
month to permit all Board members to plan their schedules.
Meetings are held in the Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300
South, Salt Lake City, Utah and are normally held in one of the
conference rooms on the fourth floor. The specific room number is
normally included in an advance mailing of the Agenda for the
meeting and is also posted on the day of the meeting in the lobby
on the 4th floor immediately adjacent to the elevator.
Parking is available in the covered parking garage on the north
side of Third South, directly across from the Heber M. Wells
Building. Reimbursement for parking is $3.00 each meeting day.
The agenda for a meeting is usually established by the Board
Secretary in consultation with the Board Chairman and the Bureau
Manager responsible for the particular occupation or profession.
Any Board member can request that an item be placed on the agenda
by simply contacting the Board Secretary who will then coordinate
it with others as necessary.
Board meetings for most Boards are concluded within four hours;
however, some Boards meet for a full day to complete their monthly
business.
If a Hearing is held on the day of a Board Meeting to either
5
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consider pending rules or to consider a disciplinary matter before
the Board# the meeting may require a "long full day". Rarely a
disciplinary Hearing is complex enough that it will extend for more
than one day. In those cases, the Administrative Law Judge who
will preside at the Hearing will contact each Board member in his
preparation of a Scheduling Order to facilitate the matter being
heard in its entirety before the maximum number of Board members.
A quorum present at a meeting is necessary for the Board to conduct
business. A quorum is a simple majority of the Board members who
have been appointed to the Board. If a Board meeting is scheduled
and a quorum does not appear, business cannot be conducted and the
time of those who did appear is wasted.
Each Board member's
attendance is valuable and demonstrates a courtesy to other
members.
Meetings of a Board are generally open to the public. Meetings can
be closed however upon a finding that there exists one of the
following reasons to close a meeting:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

discussion of the character, professional competence,
or physical or mental health of an individual;
strategy sessions with respect to collective
bargaining, litigation, or purchase of real property;
discussion regarding deployment of security personnel
or devices; and
investigative proceedings regarding allegations of
criminal misconduct.

To close a meeting, there
business, and two-thirds
meeting. The reason for
each member of the Board
meeting.

must first be a quorum present to conduct
of those present must vote to close the
holding a closed meeting and the vote of
shall be recorded in the minutes of the

Notice of meetings of the Board are required and the Division
facilitates the appropriate and required notice. It is unlawful to
hold a meeting of the Board without notice or without compliance
with the provisions under which an emergency meeting may be held.
Accordingly, it is important that Board members do not arrange to
hold a meeting of the Board, or any meeting which could be
interpreted to be a meeting of the Board, without total compliance
with the Open and Public Meeting Act, Chapter 4, Title 52.
Each Board is assigned to a Bureau Manager who supervises an
individual who acts as the Board Secretary. The Board Secretary
records, transcribes, and presents for approval of the Board,
minutes of each Board meeting. The Board Secretary is also charged
with knowing the statute and rules concerning the particular
profession/occupation, the policies and procedures by which
applications are handled in the division, and the action
alternatives which the Board may consider during its meetings. The
6
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Board Secretary is a vital resource and aid to the Board and should
become the Board's "right hand".
Conflicts of Interest
The ability of persons to serve on a Board is enabled by their
personal integrity and their ability to fairly and honestly deal
with issues which come before them.
It is important that Board members avoid involvement in anything
which may compromise their ability to fulfill their Board
responsibilities•
Certainly Board members will be expected to be informed about the
profession or occupation they are called upon to regulate. They
will have contact with persons who are regulated and persons who
are served by those regulated. Some will appropriately try to
influence Board members' decisions. That is expected and Board
members will want to listen carefully to the positions put forward
in order to consider all sides of an issue.
There are some attempts at influence or pressure which are not
appropriate and may well be unlawful.
If a Board member
experiences such an attempt, or has questions about the
appropriateness of any contact, he or she should immediately
consult the Bureau Manager to whom the Board has been assigned, or
the Division Director and discuss with him or her the
circumstances. If the advice of others is needed, the Manager or
Director will arrange for such advice.
If Board members are involved in discussion of, voting upon, or
otherwise acting as Board members on any issue in which they may
have a conflict of interest, they should make that conflict known
to the person presiding. If it is in a Board meeting, they should
declare the conflict to the Chairman of the Board to permit
appropriate advice and counsel to them and to the rest of the
Board. If the conflict arises in an Administrative Hearing, they
should declare the conflict to the Administrative Law Judge to
permit a ruling as to whether they can participate in the
proceeding.
It is possible that failure of a Board member to declare a conflict
may result in subsequent discovery of the conflict and an
invalidation of action taken by the Board. While that is certainly
serious, the more serious consequence is that the member's actions
may have compromised the fair and equitable handling of an issue
before the Boarc to the detriment of an applicant for license or a
licensee.
It is unfair for individual Board members to represent to anyone
what the position of the Board might be on a certain issue if the
7
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Board has not taken a position on that issue in a formal meeting of
the Board. Such a statement of position may well mislead a person
who relies upon that position and later finds out the Board's
actual position is entirely different. Each Board member must
respect the potential position of all Board members and let the
business of the Board and its decisions be represented by action
taken in formal meetings of the Board.
Laws
There are two basic types of laws with which the Boards and
Division deal in the licensing and regulation of designated
occupations or professions.
The first are statutes. Statutes are laws which are passed by the
Utah State Legislature. The primary statutes with which Board
members deal are as follows:
1. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
Act, Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated;
2.

Occupation/Profession Specific Licensing Act, a
specific Chapter, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated;

3. Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Chapter 46a,
Title 63, Utah Code Annotated; and
4.

Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 46b, Title 63,
Utah Code Annotated.

In order for there to be a change in statutes, the Legislature must
act by passing a new statute or by amending the existing statute.
That means that a statute can only be changed while the legislature
is in session.
The second type of law are rules.
Rules are adopted by the
Division in compliance with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
Rules cannot be used to create new law for which the basis does not
exist in statute. Rules are the "flesh" put on the "skeleton" of
the statute. Because rules are adopted by the Division, they can
be repealed, replaced, or amended by the Division. It is important
to remember that if the Legislature has not established the basis
for law by rule in the statute, the Division cannot establish the
rule.
The Division carefully consults with the Boards in its effort to
cause there to be changes in the statutes by enactment, amendment,
or repeal; and, involves the Boards significantly in the
development of rules to go through the administrative rulemaking
process. Mutual efforts between the Boards and Division to cause
the adoption, amendment, or repeal of rules normally involves a
8
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written comment period and a public hearing during which written
and verbal comments about the rules are carefully considered.
Licensure
The evaluation of applicants for licensure is one of the two major
functions and responsibilities of the Division.
Licensure is based upon the fact that an applicant meets some
minimum standard. Licensure does not represent that the licensee
has done anything more than meet minimum qualifications.
The minimum standard is set forth in the law, either under the
statute or rule pertaining to a particular license qualification.
Many Boards have facilitated licensure by defining for the division
the exact criteria to be used in determining if an applicant meets
the minimum qualifications. In those cases, Division personnel
evaluate the applicant against the established criteria. If the
criteria are clearly met, licensure is granted. If criteria are
clearly not met, licensure is denied.
When necessary, the
application is referred to the Board for consideration and its
recommendation with respect to licensure. This method of handling
applications for licensure results in the most expeditious handling
of applicants.
Other Boards have reserved the right to review in detail every
application and to make a specific recommendation regarding each.
This is usually associated with those classifications in which
there are subjective qualifications for licensure such as
experience or specific content in college course work.
The
expertise of the Board is necessary to permit there to be an
appropriate review.
This method of handling applications for
licensure results in a longer delay in granting licensure and
subjects the process to some criticism by individuals anxious to
enter into practice.
The Board, in consultation with the Division, must carefully
consider the process by which licensure is granted or denied as
there must be a careful balance between the right of the public to
rely on the licensure process, and the right of the individual
applicant to have a timely and fair review of the application. It
seems much wiser to withhold granting a license to an individual
about whom there is some question, rather than to grant the license
in haste and then discover action is necessary to revoke, suspend
or restrict the license because the person is not competent.
It is not uncommon to have complaints leveled against the division
and its Boards claiming that there is "gatekeeping" going on. This
is a term applied to attempts to limit entry in to a profession by
qualified persons by using the licensure process to artificially
9
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restrict entry into the market. The Division will very carefully
observe and evaluate recommendations of the Boards and the timely
handling of applications to ensure that any such claim has no basis
in fact.
Under the laws to which the Division and Boards are subject, the
authority to grant the license rests with the Division. The Board
is to make a recommendation with respect to licensure. It is very
rare that the Division does not follow the recommendation of a
Board. The advice and recommendation of the Board is given the
greatest consideration.
The applicant may appeal the licensing decision to the Executive
Director of the Department who may choose to convene a Special
Appeals Board.
A Special Appeals Board is made up of three
individuals of whom one is a member of the profession/occupation
under consideration. The Special Appeals Board hears the evidence
presented by the applicant justifying issuance of the license and
the evidence presented by the Attorney General's Office defending
the decision of the Board and Division in denying the license. The
decision of the Special Appeals Board is binding upon the Division.
If the decision is adverse to the applicant, he still may appeal
the decision to the Utah Court of Appeals.
In choosing to deny a license, the Board must give attention to its
ability to clearly articulate the reasons for denial and to make
sure the minutes of the meeting accurately set forth the reasons.
The Board is afforded governmental immunity for its official
actions; however, governmental immunity may not protect a Board
member who acts maliciously without regard for the facts. If a
Board member is ever asked to consider licensure of an individual
about whom the member cannot act fairly, the member should declare
the conflict of interest and excuse himself from voting on that
particular matter. However, caution must be exercised.
Just
because a Board member may be privileged to information about an
applicant which my indicate the individual may not be qualified for
licensure, does not mean that he or she should not bring that
information to the attention of the Board and vote on the matter if
he or she can do so based upon cause, the facts, the public
interest, and not a malicious intent to damage or harm the
applicant.
Disciplinary matters
Unfortunately, licensees sometimes engage in unprofessional or
unlawful conduct related to the occupation or profession in which
they are licensed; or, unlicensed persons engage in acts or
practices which are regulated under title 58.
When such violations occur, the Bureau of Investigation normally
conducts an investigation. If the investigation fails to document
10
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unlawful or unprofessional conduct, the case is closed.
If investigation documents unprofessional or unlawful conduct and
the Office of the Attorney General determines that the
investigation was adequate and that the proposed Petition is
legally
sufficient,
the
investigator
who
conducted
the
investigation files a Petition before the Division. A Petition is
a document much like a Complaint filed in a criminal case. It
describes the allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct and
the laws which have been violated.
The Division counsel reviews the Petition and determines if there
is a basis to consider disciplinary action. If a basis if found,
he issues a Notice of Agency Action which is mailed together with
the Petition to the subject of the investigation, now called the
Respondent.
The Notice of Agency Action advises the Respondent
that the action has been filed, describes the action, defines the
procedures which will be followed, and advises the Respondent of
his legal options.
A Respondent is given thirty days to file a Response to the
Petition. A Response is the Respondent's opportunity to admit,
deny, or offer any explanation with respect to the allegations
which have been filed against him.
There are primarily two methods in which a matter is then resolved.
In the first method, the Respondent contacts the Office of the
Attorney General and requests to settle the case pending against
him.
The Office of the Attorney General consults with the
Investigator and Bureau Manager. The Bureau Manager consults with
a member of the Board.
The Office of the Attorney General
negotiates a Stipulation in which the Respondent admits to unlawful
or unprofessional conduct and agrees to those sanctions necessary
to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. Sanctions may
include reprimand,
restriction, probation,
suspension, and
revocation of one's license and/or a cease and desist order. The
Stipulation is then presented to the Division Director for his
approval. The Director may either accept the Stipulation and issue
an Order adopting its terms or may suggest modification to or
reject the Stipulation.
In the second method, if a matter is inappropriate for settlement,
is appropriate but is not achieved, or if the Respondent simply
denies the allegations and demands the matter be heard, a Hearing
is scheduled before the appropriate Board. A Hearing is not unlike
a trial. The Division sets forth its case and the Respondent has
an opportunity to defend himself.
Normally both sides are
represented by counsel.
The Administrative Procedures Act requires that all Hearings be
held before a "Presiding Officer", who it defines as the Division
11
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Director.
However, the Act permits the Director to designate
another individual or group of individuals to perform part of or
all of his role. Because of the complexity and diversity of our
proceedings, the director designates an Administrative Law Judge as
the Presiding Officer to regulate the proceedings and the
appropriate Board as the Presiding Officer to act as fact finder.
The Director participates in the hearing to assist him in later
acting upon the Boards' Recommended Order. The Director is not
present during the Board's deliberations.
As fact finder of the proceedings, the Board hears the evidence
presented at the hearing, deliberates upon the evidence, and enters
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Recommended Order.
As regulator of the proceedings, the Administrative Law Judge
presides over motion practice and admissibility of evidence, and
ensures that the proceedings are fair and orderly. Following the
hearing, the Administrative Law Judge advises the Board during its
deliberations and puts in writing the Board's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order.
One of the questions which always arises with a Board member who
must consider a Recommended Order is, "What are the options we may
consider in making a recommendation?" The answer is generally that
Orders usually contain any one of more of the following conditions:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

In

considering

Private censure or reprimand;
Public censure or reprimand;
Probation for some designated period of
time with specific terms and conditions
directed at protecting the public from
continued acts or omissions which have
represented the Respondent's practices
in the past;
Suspension of license for some designated
period;
Suspension of license for some designated
period followed by probation with specific
terms and conditions as in (3) above;
Suspension of license, suspension stayed,
probation with specific terms and conditions
as in (3) above;
Revocation of license;
Revocation of license, revocations stayed,
suspension for some designated period,
followed by probation with specific terms
and conditions as in (3) above; and
Revocation of license, revocation stayed,
probation with specific terms and conditions
as in (3) above.
a

Recommended

Order,

Board

members

should

be
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imaginative and draft an Order which offers creative solutions to
the problems identified in the Hearing.
Following issuance, the Board's written Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order are presented to the
Division Director for his review and issuance of a Final Order. In
almost every case, the Director's Final Order affirms the Board's
Recommended Order. However, on very infrequent occasions, the
Director's Final Order modifies or rejects a part or all of the
Board's Recommended Order and enters new or amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
After entry of an Order, the Respondent may appeal the Order to the
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce through a Request
for Agency Review, and after exhausting his administrative
remedies, may appeal the Order to the Utah Court of Appeals.
During the time in which the appeal is being considered, the effect
of the Order is usually stayed, meaning it does not go into effect
until the Executive Director or Court of Appeals has ruled on the
appeal.
Compensation
Generally, a Board member is reimbursed for attendance at Board
meetings at the rate of $60.00 for a half day meeting and $90.00
for a full day meeting.
Because of the number of Boards and the frequency of meetings, the
cost of reimbursement for Boards can be a very substantial amount.
Because of very tight budget restrictions, the Division asks for
the cooperation of Boards in conducting their meetings in an
efficient manner. This will help the Division live within its
budget and not require diversion of funds from other programs such
as an already limited out-of-state travel budget for Board members.
Board members who are state employees being paid in their regular
position at the time Board meetings are held are not compensated
for their attendance at Board meetings.
If a Board member is required to travel on state business, the
Board member will be compensated for the costs of travel, lodging,
meals and other necessary expenses in accordance with existing
state policy.
The obligation to compensate Board members for Board attendance
must be pre-approved by the Bureau Manager responsible for the
particular Board. The obligation to compensate Board members for
travel must be pre-approved by the Division Director and Department
Executive Director.
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Media Contacts
There may be occasions when the representatives of the media
contact Board members for comment on an issue facing the Board or
one involving the profession or occupation regulated by the Board.
The media serve the public and have been helpful to the Division in
having the public understand the role of the Division and its
Boards. It is our intent to be cooperative in every way possible.
Remember that Boards may be called upon to act as fact finders and
to issue a Recommended Order in a case involving a licensee. If
Board members discuss a particular case with the media, they may
well disqualify themselves from being able to fulfill their duties
in hearing that case in a formal Hearing.
If a Board member has any questions about discussing any matter
with the media, please feel free to call the Bureau Manager, the
Division Director, or even the Executive Director of the Department
for counsel and advice.
Liaison With the Division
A Board member's primary contact with the Division is the Bureau
Manager with Division management responsibility for their Board and
the Board Secretary assigned to their Board.
The Bureau Manager represents the Division in the normal working
relationship between the Board and the Division. The manager is
charged with knowing the position and philosophy of the Division
Director, the Department Executive Director and the Governor with
respect to the "business of the Division".
The Board Secretary is supervised by the Bureau Manager and is a
senior licensing specialist in the Bureau to which the particular
Board is assigned and therefore, is very knowledgeable about the
process of licensing.
Board members are certainly welcome to communicate directly with
the Division Director in any matter they desire.
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When property is ordered turned over to the Division, the Chief
shall determine the appropriate disposition.

If the property is to be

destroyed, the Chief shall assign two investigators to accomplish the
destruction.

The assigned investigators shall:

(1)

Inventory the items to be destroyed.

(2)

Note the time, date, and method of destruction.

(3)

Thoroughly destroy the items.

(4)

Return

a

sworn

affidavit

to

the

Director

of

the

Department attesting to the destruction.
At no time will an investigator authorize a law enforcement agency
to keep any property seized under the authority of the Controlled
Substance Act.
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CITATIONS,
(A)

CITATION PROGRAM POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

1.

These investigative policies and procedures implement the citation
program established by §58-55-13, U.C.A.

2.

Where appropriate, citations may be issued by DOPL investigators
for the following offenses:
a.

58-55-2(32)(a).

Engaging in a construction trade, acting as

a contractor, or representing oneself to be engaged in a
construction trade requiring licensure, unless the person
doing any of these is appropriately licensed or exempted from
licensure under this chapter;
b.

58-55-2(32)(b).

Acting in a construction trade beyond the

scope of the license held; or
c.

58-55-2(32)(c).

hiring

or

employing

in

any

manner

an

unlicensed person, other than an employee for wages who is not
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required to be licensed under this chapter, to engage in a
construction trade for which licensure is required or to act
as a contractor or subcontractor

in a construction trade

requiring licensure.
For purposes of the citation program an investigator is defined as
an investigator assigned to the Contractors Section of the Bureau
of

Investigations

and

an

auditor

assigned

to

the

Bureau

of

shall,

as

Financial Audit.
When

a

citation

is

inappropriate,

investigators

appropriate, close a complaint or an investigation without action,
screen a completed case with the Division Enforcement Counsel for
stipulated settlement or for review prior to issuance of a Notice
of Agency Action commencing an informal adjudicative proceeding, or
screen a completed case with the Office of the Attorney General for
review prior to issuance of a Notice of Agency Action commencing a
formal adjudicative proceeding.
Citations shall only be issued
actually

for citable offenses that are

observed by an investigator

investigator

through

a

completed

or are documented

investigation

in

by an

which

the

investigator has had recent personal contact with the subject of
the investigation.

All citations will be issued in person by the

investigator to the recipient of the citation.
Citations shall not be issued beyond six months following the date
of the citable offense.
Investigators are instructed to utilize the citation program to
encourage compliance with the Construction Trades Licensing Act.
When

appropriate

extenuating

or

mitigating

circumstances

are

present, an investigator may choose to advise an offender that the
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investigator will not issue a citation if the offender comes into
compliance with applicable law within a reasonable period of time.
Before issuing citations for citable offenses, investigators shall
ensure that every element of the offense for which a citation is to
be issued is supported by competent evidence and shall explore
possible defenses and mitigating, extenuating,
circumstances, if any.

and aggravating

Investigators shall promptly record such

information in the documentation section on the back side of the
investigator's copy of the citation.
The format for citations shall be as established at exhibit 1.
Citations shall be color coded and bear the following legend:
Copy 1 - Recipient Copy
Copy 2 - Division Copy
Copy 3 - Supervisor Copy
Copy 4 - Investigator Copy
Numbered

books

of

citations

shall

be

issued

to

each

DOPL

investigator and shall be an accountable item.
There is established a DOPL Recommended Citation Fine Schedule at
exhibit 2.

The Schedule shall appear on the reverse side of the

recipient's copy of citations.
The DOPL Citation Fine Schedule shall apply to all citations issued
by investigators in which a fine is issued.

If an investigator

believes a more serious outcome is warranted in an individual case,
the investigator shall proceed by filing a petition.
Investigators are encouraged to issue cease and desist orders with
each citation. Normally, a cease and desist order should be issued
in addition to a fine; however, where appropriate, a cease and
desist order may be issued without a fine.
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Investigators shall

promptly record their justification for the issuance of a cease and
desist order without a fine in the documentation section on the
back side of the investigator's copy of the citation.
When a person to be cited has committed multiple offenses under the
same or different offense codes, investigators should evaluate the
seriousness of the overall violation of law in determining whether
to

issue

offenses

a single
cited

citation

under

or multiple

a single

considered as a single offense.

citation

citations.

Multiple

shall collectively

be

The applicable fine from the DOPL

Citation Fine Schedule for a citation involving multiple offenses
shall be the fine applicable to the most serious offense.
Every citation shall include a fine and/or a cease and desist
order.

At

the present

time, the division

has opted

not to

implement a notice in lieu of a citation, as permitted by Section
58-55-13(4)(c), U.C.A.
There is established a Notice of Response format at exhibit 3.
Notices of Response shall be included in the back of citation
books.

Investigators shall provide a Notice of Response to the

each recipient of a citation.
If the recipient of a citation refuses to sign for the receipt of
the citation, this fact shall be noted in the remarks section of
the citation.
Investigators shall avoid advising the recipient of a citation how
to respond

to a citation.

Instead,

the recipient

should be

referred to the Citation and the Notice of Response documents
themselves or to their attorney.
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Care should be taken to avoid

creating any impression that the fine and/or cease and desist order
imposed

by

the

citation

is

effective

immediately

without

an

opportunity to be heard.
Investigators shall not negotiate stipulated settlements or accept
payment of administrative fines.
Investigators shall coordinate the issuance of a citation with
their supervisor no later than the next business day following
issuance and shall promptly send or deliver to the Division its
copy of the citation.
Citation

Quality

The supervisor shall promptly perform a

Control

Review

and may

choose

to dismiss a

citation where appropriate.
Citations

become

final upon

receipt

of

a Notice

of

Response

reflecting that the recipient of a citation has chosen not to
contest

the

citation.

If

no

response

is received

from

the

recipient of a citation, the citation shall become final 20 days
from the service thereof.

If a citation is timely contested, it

becomes final upon entry of an order by the presiding officer
affirming or modifying the citation.
Following

the

issuance

of

citations,

investigators

shall

not

subsequently issue follow-on citations for a continuation of the
offense at the same

location to the recipient

of an

initial

citation until the initial citation becomes final unless, upon a
showing of unusual and compelling circumstances, the investigator's
supervisor approves a deviation from this policy. Deviations shall
be recorded in the documentation section on the back side of the
investigator's copy of the citation.
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The Division shall notify each person contesting a citation of the
date, time, and place of the scheduled hearing along with the
identity of the presiding officer by completing the Notice of
Hearing on the reverse side of the Notice of Response (exhibit 4),
and mailing a copy of the Notice of Hearing to the person by first
class mail, postage prepaid.
Hearings for contested citations requested on or before the first
of each month shall, unless circumstaces require the Division to
schedule a different date, be held on the 3rd Monday of that month
beginning at 9:00 a.m., in room 428, before a Presiding Officer
designated by the Division Director.

If the 3rd Monday is a

holiday, the hearing shall be moved to the fourth Monday of the
month.
If the recipient of a citation denies committing the offense cited,
it is the Division's burden to present competent evidence on each
of the issues under consideration at a hearing to a preponderance
of evidence standard.
It is the Respondent's right to testify, present evidence, and
comment on the issues at a hearing.

In putting on evidence,

Respondents may testify, call and examine witnesses, and introduce
documentary evidence.
Either party may testify, present evidence or comment on the issues
at a hearing with or without the assistance of counsel.
a.

When proceeding without counsel, a Respondent may and the
Division

shall

evidence

is

Presiding

simply

available

Officer

to

appropriate.
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inform
for
take

the

Presiding

presentation
such

Officer

and

evidence

as

permit
he

what
the
deems

b.

A Respondent may in addition choose to act as his own counsel.

c.

It is the responsibility of a party who is proceeding without
counsel, to arrange to have all necessary evidence available
for presentation at the hearing.

The public perception of the hearing process hinges on their
perception of the role of the Presiding Officer.

The integrity of

the role of Presiding Officer is therefore critical and must be
fully understood, scrupulously respected, and carefully protected
by all involved in the citation process, particularly the Division.
a.

The Presiding Officer is appointed by the Director, Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Department of
Commerce.

b.

The

Presiding

objective

Officer

fact

is

appointed

as

an

impartial

and

finder designated to review the contested

citations on the hearing docket.

He is not an advocate of

either the Division or the Respondent.
c.

In

reviewing

a

contested

citation,

it

is

the

Presiding

Officer's responsibility to determine whether the offense
shown

on a contested

citation

is supported

by

competent

evidence and if so, whether the citation should have been
issued.
the

If both questions are answered in the affirmative by

presiding

officer,

it

is

the

Presiding

Officer's

responsibility to then determine whether the sanction imposed
by the citation should be affirmed, rejected, or modified.
d.

In accordance with §63-46b-5(e) and Rule 2 of the Model
Administrative

Discovery

Rules

for

Agency

Adjudicative

Proceedings, the Presiding Officer may issue subpoeKf^s or
other orders to compel the production of necessary evidence,
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by his own action

or upon the request

of either party.

Normally, the Presiding Officer will only issue a subpoena or
other

order upon

the request

of a party

and

it

is the

responsibility of the party requesting the subpoena or other
order to show probable cause for the issuance of the order,
e.

To

ensure

that

contested

citation

hearings

are

handled

consistently by Presiding Officers, the Informal Contested
Citations Hearing Instructions, the Presiding Officer Script
and Presiding Officer Model Orders at exhibits 5, 6, 9, and 10
respectively, are prepared as recommended guides.
Issuing investigators shall be responsible for initial entry of
their citations into the CRIS data base.
The Administrative Assistant to the Division Director shall be
responsible for tracking the receipt of Notices of Response, for
preparing a monthly Contested Citation Hearing Docket and a monthly
Uncontested

Citation Report,

and

for creating

and maintaining

Citation Hearing Files. Citation Hearing Files shall be maintained
by year of issuance and citation number.
The

Supervisor,

Bureau

of

Investigations,

Construction

Trades

Licensing Act Section, shall be responsible for a monthly Pending
Citation Report and Closed Citation Report using the CRIS data
base. Disposition shall be determined by an evaluation of Citation
Quality

Control

Uncontested

Reviews,

Citation

the

Report,

Citation
Orders

Hearing

issued

by

Docket,
the

the

Presiding

Officer, and the passage of time.
a)

The Pending Citation Report shall be alphabetically arranged
and shall contain the following information:
i)

person cited;
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ii)

date of issuance;

iii)

place of issuance;

iv)

offense code;

v)

sanction;

vi)

issuing investigator;

vii)

response deadline; and

viii) current status,
b)

The Closed Citation Report shall be alphabetically arranged
and shall contain the following information:
i)

person cited;

ii)

date of issuance;

iii)

place of issuance;

iv)

offense code;

v)

sanction;

vi)

issuing investigator;

vii)

disposition; and

viii) method of disposition.
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CITATION
Department of Commerce
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
Construction Compliance Section
P.O. Box 45805
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

ISSUED PURSUANT TO § 58-55-13(5) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), AS AMENDED, AS FOLLOWS:
DL#:

ISSUED TO:

DOB:

DOPL#:

S.S.f:

HOME ADDRESS:

PHONE*:

DBA/EMPLOYER:

DOPL LIC#:

BUSINESS ADDRESS:

PHONE#:
DATE ISSUED:

DATE OF OFFENSE:

TIME OF OFFENSE:

LOCATION OF OFFENSE:
OFFENSE CODE

DESCRIPTION

• 558-55-2(32)(a)

Engaged in or represented himself to be engaged in a construction
trade or acted as or represented himself to be acting as a
contractor in a construction trade requiring licensure while not
licensed or excepted from licensure.

D 558-55-2(32)(b)

Acted in a construction trade beyond the scope of the license held.

D S58-55-2(32)(c)

Hired or employed in any manner an unlicensed contractor or person
who was required to be licensed.

REMARKS:

D ADMINISTRATIVE F I N E

(See reverse)

D CEASE AND D E S I S T ORDER

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS CITATION AND
CERTIFY THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE
RIGHTS ADVISEMENT CONTAINED BELOW AND HAVE
BEEN PROVIDED A NOTICE OF RESPONSE

RECIPIENT'S

SIGNATURE

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION IN THIS
CITATION IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.

DATE
READ

INVESTIGATOR'S

SIGNATURE

CAREFULLY

This citation may be contested by notifying the Division in writing within 20 calendar days
of the service of the citation that you wish to contest the citation at a hearing conducted
under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. A citation which is not so
contested becomes the final order of the Division and is not subject to further agency
review. Any person who fails to comply with a citation after it becomes the final order of
the Division is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and the Division may refuse to issue or renew
or may suspend, revoke, or place on probation a license you hold or apply for.
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ExniDir z

MAXIMUM FINE SCHEDULE PERMITTED BY S 58-55-13(4)(i), U.C.A.
First Offense

$1,000

Second Offense

$2,000

Subsequent Offenses

$2,000 per day

DOPL CITATION FINE SCHEDULE
FIRST OFFENSE

Violation

All Except
Electrical
or Plumbing

Electrical
or Plumbing

58-55-2(32)(a)

$200.00

$400.00

58-55-2(32)(b)

$200.00

$400.00

58-55-2(32)(c)

$400.00

$600.00

SECOND OFFENSE

Violation

All Except
Electrical
or Plumbing

Electrical
Plumbing

58-55-2(32)(a)

$600.00

$1,000.00

58-55-2(32)(b)

$600.00

$1,000.00

58-55-2(32)(c)

$800.00

$1,200.00

THIRD OFFENSE
Citations shall not be issued for third offenses except in
extraordinary circumstances approved in writing by the
Division Director.
Note: If multiple offenses are cited on the same citation,
the fine shall be determined by evaluating the most serious
offense.
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Exhibit 3

NOTICE OF RESPONSE
Department of Commerce
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
Construction Compliance Section
P.O. Box 45805
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

CITATION #
NAME:
ADDRESS:

DATE OF CITATION:
PHONE NUMBER:

THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU MAY BE CONTESTED BY NOTIFYING THE DIVISION IN
WRITING WITHIN 20 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE SERVICE OF THE CITATION THAT YOU
WISH TO CONTEST THE CITATION AT A HEARING CONDUCTED UNDER TITLE 63,
CHAPTER 46b, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. A CITATION WHICH IS NOT
CONTESTED BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO
FURTHER REVIEW. ANY PERSON WHO FAILS TO COMPLY WITH A CITATION AFTER IT
BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION IS GUILTY OF A CLASS A
MISDEMEANOR AND THE DIVISION MAY REFUSE TO ISSUE OR RENEW OR MAY
SUSPEND, REVOKE, OR PLACE ON PROBATION A LICENSE YOU HOLD OR APPLY FOR.
PLEA8E SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES IN RESPONDING
TO THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU:
__

1. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION,
CHOOSE NOT TO CONTEST THE CITATION AND TO COMPLY WITH IT8
SANCTIONS, AND HEREBY SUBMIT THE FINE SHOWN ON THE DOPL
CITATION FINE SCHEDULE ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE CITATION.

___

2. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
BUT REQUEST A HEARING TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
OFFENSE.

__

3. I DENY COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
AND REQUEST A HEARING TO CONTEST THE CITATION.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE THE ABOVE ELECTION
OF RIGHTS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I REQUEST A HEARING, THE DIVISION WILL
NOTIFY ME IN WRITING OF THE HEARING DATE AND THAT IF I FAIL TO APPEAR AT
THE HEARING, A DEFAULT JUDGEMENT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST ME.
I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE PRESIDING
OFFICER AT A HEARING ARE FIRST, WHETHER THE CITED OFFENSE IS SUPPORTED
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE; SECOND, WHETHER THE CITATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ISSUED; AND IF SO, THIRD, WHETHER THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE CITATION
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, REJECTED OR MODIFIED (DECREASED, INCREASED,
SUSPENDED, REMITTED, OR VACATED).
SIGNATURE:

DATE:
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Exhibit 4

NOTICE OF HEARING
Department of Commerce
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
Construction Compliance Section
P.O. Box 45805
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

"NUMBER"

S>ursuant to your racpaest,. a Citation Hearing has been scheduled for
, beginning at
in Room
of the Kfebsr M*
Wells Bld<j, located at l€0 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, !££• Th&
presiding officer is
TJbte hearing is your
ww_ww_^*
opportunity to put en evidence and comment on the issues.

In compliance *dm the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids
and services) during this meeting should notify Jud Weiler, ADA Coordinator, Division ofOccupational and Professional Licensing, 160 East
4J00 Soum,Saa Lake Oty, Utah
84145-(»aS.ph^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the
day of
, 199 , a true
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING was sent first class
mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
(Recipient of Citation)
(Address)
(City), (State) (Zip)

(Name)
(Title)
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EXHIBIT 5
INFORMAL CONTESTED CITATION HEARING INSTRUCTIONS
At your request, the citation you received has been scheduled
for a hearing as shown in the Notice of Hearing. Your case
will be heard in the order shown on the hearing docket posted
on the hearing room door.
These instructions have been prepared to help you understand
the hearing process and to enable you to prepare for your
hearing.
The statutes and rules governing contested citation hearings
are the following: Chapter 46b, Title 63, Utah Administrative
Procedures Act; Chapter 1, Title 58, Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing Act; Chapter 55, Title 58,
Construction Trades Licensing Act; and Rules 151-46b and 15646b, Utah Administrative Procedures Act rules.
Dan S. Jones has been designated by the Director of the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing to serve
as the Presiding Officer for these hearings. Please address
him as Mr. Jones.
The Presiding Officer is an neutral fact finder designated to
review contested citations. He is not an advocate for the
Division or for the Respondent.
The only
follows:
a.
b.
c.

issues properly before the Presiding Officer are as
Was there a legal basis to issue the citation?
If so, was it fair to issue the citation?
If so, what is the appropriate penalty?

You may represent yourself or be represented by counsel.
Ordinarily, the Division is not represented by counsel at
contested citation hearings.
If you are denying the offense, it is the Division's
responsibility to prove its case against you by a
preponderance of the evidence.
If you are admitting the
offense, it is your responsibility to prove that the citation
should be dismissed or that the penalty should be reduced.
The Administrative Procedures Act provides that the parties in
an informal hearing are entitled to testify, present evidence
and comment on the issues.
In presenting evidence, the
parties may examine witnesses and submit exhibits.
A the request of either party, the Presiding Officer will
examine the witnesses called by a party.
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11.

Exhibits should be premarked numerically by the Division and
alphabetically by the Respondent. Where several exhibits will
be offered, an index is desirable.

12.

The Presiding Officer will exclude any evidence he deems
irrelevant, repetitious, or improper.

13.

If the Presiding Officer finds that the citation is
appropriate, he will impose the fine shown on the DOPL
Citation Fine Schedule unless good cause is shown for a lesser
or greater amount.

14.

If a fine is imposed, it is payable immediately unless good
cause is shown for delayed payment. Scheduling the hearing
results in a significant delay in which you can prepare to pay
a possible fine. Therefore, good cause may be difficult to
establish.

15.

Appearing at this hearing does not in itself constitute good
cause for a reduction in fine. Rather, you must prove that a
reduction in fine is justified.

16.

Moreover, compliance with the law after your citation was
issued is not considered good cause for a reduction in
fine.
Likewise, noncompliance with the law after your citation was
issued is not good cause to increase any fine imposed in this
case. However, it could result in additional disciplinary
action.

17.

Ordinarily, a written order will be entered at the conclusion
of each hearing. However, where necessary, the Presiding
Officer will take a case under advisement and mail a decision
to the parties as soon as possible following the hearing.

18.

The order will include a notice of any right of administrative
or judicial review available to the parties.

19.

If you have any questions concerning these instructions please
ask the Presiding Officer for an explanation before your case
is heard. You will be asked to submit a signed copy of these
instructions to the Presiding Officer at that time.

I affirm that I have read and understand the instructions outlined
above,

Respondent
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TabM

Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
160 East 300 South
P.O.Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR RECORD

Requester:

W i l l i a m »1. . S t i l l i n g

Parsons, ftehlpr & I at.impr
7

Written Request Received:

Date:

IX] Request approved:

[ ] In full

/

1Q

Q4

"1Q ^

[XJ In part

KXI Record(s) are attached.
[ ] Call
[ ] A fee of $

to make arrangements.
is due for duplicating the record(s).

[ ] Because the record is non-public, we require evidence of your identity before the record can be released.
[ ] The attached Disclosure and Agreement must be completed and returned before the non-public record(s) can be
released.
[ ] Request denied:

[ ] In full

[ ] In part

[ ] Notice of Denial of Request for Records is attached for explanation.
[ ] Request is neither approved or denied:

[ ] In full

[ ] In part

[ ] Notice of Estimated Time Required to Respond to Request for Records is attached for explanation.

IX] Other: - See explanatory comments on backside
[ ] The Division does not maintain the following record(s) you request:

[ ] The entity that we believe does maintain the record is:

Contact Person:

DOPL-FM-GRAMA-003 REV 6/7/94

Carol Inglesby

Telephone:

SEE REVERSE

53Q-6626

EXPLANATORY COMMENTS:

Request #1 - Documents are enclosed
Roofing,—The other cases that have
et al cases- I believe your office
you need an additional copy, please

with regards to the citation issued to Dockery
been converted to formal are the Merit Electrical ^
has already received copies of these cases. If
contact me 530-6626.

Request #2 - In reviewing records, there have been no adjudicative proceedings that
were converted from informal to formal or formal to informal with the exception
of the citation cases mentioned above.
Request #3 - not applicable
Request #4 - In a telephone conversation with Barbara Polich of your office on
7-26-94 with Robert Hunt, she indicated your office did not want a ropy of all citatiolhs
issued but would rather have a statistical summary regarding citations. That summary ||is
pnrlnspH.

Tn yrmr rpqiipst. you askftd fnr "t.hp prnrpdural

citations".
doe*

trark fnr adjndirating

Our office is unclear as to exactly what you are asking for.

hax/P a r i t a f i n n

p n l i r i p g and prnrpdtirps manual.

thnsp

The Divisio|fi

HflWPVPr, that, manual i s a

protected record. You may however want to contact Robert Hunt, Assistant Attorney
General, regarding possible release of thp manual with the understanding its contents
would remain protected.

DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING

C(MJ W
Title:

. . .

0^0?V)

Date:

7-28-94

.

Administrative Assistant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the **V day of
July
.1994
a true and correct copy of the foregoing
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR RECORD was sent first class mail, postage prepaid, to the requester at the
following address indicated on the Request for Record(s):

William J. Stilling
Parsons Behler & Latimer
201 South Main Street Suite 1800
SLC UT 84101

(MWMimmf
Title:

Adminstrative Assistant

CITATION STATS
From 10-01-92 To 07-15-94
CITATIONS ISSUED

1313

COMPLIANCE WITH CITATION

971

DISMISSED BY DIVISION

25

OVERTURNED AT HEARING
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CEASE AND DESIST

76

CONVERTED TO FORMAL ACTION

6

Merit Electric
Kit Carson
Jonathan Juretich
Dan Johnson
Chris Schiffman
Dockery Roofing, Inc.
CITATION CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

1

PENDING ENFORCEMENT/CRIMINAL

1

PENDING ENFORCEMENT/CIVIL
ISSUED PENDING RESPONSE
ISSUED PENDING HEARING
WENT TO HEARINGS
CITATION FINES
UNCONTESTED CITATIONS

61
133
6
314
$274,840.00
1,094

